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FLOURISHING FORTIES AGAINST FLAMING FIFTIES: IS 
REVERSE AGE DISCRIMINATION ACTIONABLE UNDER THE AGE 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT?1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On February 5, 2001, twenty-eight-year-old Stacey Stillman, one of the 
castaways from the popular television series “Survivor,” filed a lawsuit 
claiming that the producer rigged the show by encouraging other cast members 
to vote her off the island.2  She further claimed that the producer’s motivation 
was to ensure that the only senior citizen left on the island—crusty seventy-
two-year-old Rudy Boesch—would continue to participate in the show.3  
Stillman’s claim was regarded as highly unusual, and it provoked joking 
commentary in newspapers and on television, as well as a lawsuit directed 
back at Stillman.  It seemed preposterous at the time that a young and attractive 
woman could be discriminated against in favor of an old man, and have a 
viable claim.  Now, in 2003, this idea does not appear as bizarre.  Change the 
scenario a little: add just twelve years to Stillman’s age, presume there is no 
restrictive employment contract and that no charges of fraudulent interference 
with the show are involved—and voila!  You now have a cognizable age 
discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA),4 at least according to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.5  
Specifically, a defendant-employer may now be found liable for reverse age 
discrimination. 
“Reverse discrimination” is the term that has been coined by the courts to 
refer to discrimination in favor of a minority group against a majority.6  
 
 1. The labels “flourishing forties” and “flaming fifties” were assigned to different 
generational cohorts by Gail Sheehy, the author of the acclaimed book New Passages.  See GAIL 
SHEEHY, NEW PASSAGES: MAPPING YOUR LIFE ACROSS TIME 24 (1995). 
 2. See ‘Survivor’ Castoff, Producers Wash into Court, 12 NO. 11 ANDREWS SPORTS & 
ENT. LITIG. REP. 11 (2001). 
 3. Editorial, Bits and Pieces, WINSTON-SALEM J., Feb. 10, 2001, at 16, available at 2001 
WL 3040737. 
 4. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–634 (2000)). 
 5. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 
123 S.Ct. 1786 (2003). 
 6. The term also sometimes refers to “affirmative action,” but often has different meanings 
depending on the context in which it is used.  See generally Philip L. Fetzer, ‘Reverse 
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Reverse discrimination claims brought under federal anti-discrimination laws 
have proliferated in the past several years.7  Such claims have been held viable 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)8 when plaintiffs who 
are not members of a racial minority sued for discrimination on the basis of 
race.9  Similarly, male workers have claimed the protection of Title VII when 
discriminated against in favor of women.10 
Reverse discrimination has a different connotation when used in the 
context of age discrimination claims than it does when used in connection with 
race or sex discrimination.  According to its terms, the ADEA makes it 
unlawful to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, 
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”11  
The ADEA protects only employees who are forty years old and older.12  As a 
result, federal case law appears well settled as far as reverse discrimination 
claims of workers under forty are concerned; the plain language of the statute 
puts them outside of ADEA protection.13 Unlike reverse race or sex 
discrimination that focuses on discrimination against those who historically 
have been free from discrimination,14 reverse age discrimination is 
discrimination based on relative youth and occurs within a protected class.15  In 
 
Discrimination’: The Political Use of Language, 12 NAT’L BLACK L.J. 212, 216 (1993) 
(describing the origins and discussing various definitions of the term ‘reverse discrimination’). 
 7. See Timothy K. Giordano, Comment, Different Treatment for Non-Minority Plaintiffs 
under Title VII: A Call for Modification of the Background Circumstances Test to Ensure That 
Separate Is Equal, 49 EMORY L.J. 993, 993 (2000) (stating that the number of reverse 
discrimination claims has almost doubled since 1991, constituting 17.1% of the claims filed with 
the Equal Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in 1996). 
 8. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 255, Title VII, § 703 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000)). 
 9. John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson, Reverse Age Discrimination, 210 N.Y. L.J. 3, 3 
(1993).  See, e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976). 
 10. See, e.g., Parker v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Title 
VII lawsuit brought by a male railroad employee alleging that he was denied a promotion to 
become a locomotive fireman because of preferences given to black and female employees). 
 11. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000).  It is also unlawful under the ADEA provisions to “limit, 
segregate, or classify” employees in a manner that would deprive the employee of “employment 
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” and “reduce the wage rate 
of any employee in order to comply with [the ADEA].”  Id. §§ 623(a)(2)–623(a)(3). 
 12. Id. § 631(a) (stating in pertinent part that “[t]he prohibitions in this chapter shall be 
limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age”). 
 13. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 312 (1996). 
 14. See Fetzer, supra note 6, at 216. 
 15. Jeffrey Paul Fuhrman, Comment, Can Discrimination Law Affect the Imposition of a 
Minimum Age Requirement for Employment in the National Basketball Association?, 3 U. PA. J. 
LAB. & EMP. L. 585, 600 (2001). 
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other words, within the ambit of the ADEA, reverse discrimination refers to 
discrimination against the “younger-old” in favor of the “older-old.” 
While age discrimination claims have been on the rise in the past several 
years,16 litigation based on claims of reverse discrimination has been rare 
under the ADEA.17  Until recently, the few federal courts that addressed the 
issue of reverse age discrimination under the ADEA refused to extend the 
protection of the statute to workers older than forty who alleged discrimination 
based on their relative youth.18  The legal landscape changed, however, in June 
2002 with the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Cline v. General Dynamics Land 
Systems, Inc.,19 which found that the ADEA protects workers in their forties 
from being treated less favorably than older workers. 
This Note will discuss the issue of reverse age discrimination within the 
protected class in light of the Cline decision and will address the circuit split 
created by Cline.  Although the term reverse age discrimination has sometimes 
been applied to discrimination against workers under forty,20 this Note will 
address only the type of discrimination that affects workers older than forty 
who are within the class protected by the ADEA.  Part II of the Note will 
briefly discuss the language, purpose, and history of the ADEA.  Part III will 
profile the cases in the current circuit split.  Part IV will offer a critical 
assessment of recognizing a cause of action for reverse discrimination under 
the ADEA and will argue that the text of the ADEA, its goals, and its 
legislative history require that a cause of action based on reverse age 
discrimination should not be recognized.  Part V will examine whether it is 
reasonable to recognize reverse discrimination under Title VII while denying it 
under the ADEA and will conclude that the courts’ treatment of reverse 
discrimination under Title VII is inapposite for the purposes of the ADEA.  
Support for this idea will be gleaned from the marked differences between age, 
 
 16. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Charge Statistics: FY 1992 
Through FY 2001, at http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/charges.html (last modified Feb. 6, 2003) 
(illustrating that ADEA charge filings increased from 18.3% of all discrimination charges filed 
with the EEOC in 1999 to 21.5% of charges filed in 2001). 
 17. See Furfaro & Josephson, supra note 9, at 3. 
 18. See, e.g., Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434 (9th Cir. 1995); Hamilton v. Caterpillar, 
Inc., 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992); Greer v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 00 CIV 1272 SAS, 
2001 WL 137330 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2001); Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 941 F. Supp. 284, 
287 (D. Conn. 1996), aff’d, 116 F.3d 465 (2d Cir. 1997); Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F. Supp. 1131 
(D. Me. 1995). 
 19. 296 F.3d at 466. 
 20. Reverse age discrimination for people younger than forty remains a hot topic for debate 
and has been addressed by several commentators.  See, e.g., Fuhrman, supra note 15, at 602 
(advocating the extension of the ADEA protection to people younger than forty); Bryan B. 
Woodruff, Note, Unprotected Until Forty: The Limited Scope of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act of 1967, 73 IND. L.J. 1295, 1295 (1998) (arguing that Congress should prohibit 
all age discrimination regardless of the employee’s age). 
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sex, and race as protected categories and will be illustrated by Supreme Court 
decisions.  Public policy considerations that stem from the possibility of 
allowing a cause of action for reverse age discrimination will be examined in 
Part VI.  The Note will conclude that the circuit split should be resolved 
against the availability of the cause of action for employees older than forty 
claiming reverse age discrimination. 
II.  GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE ADEA 
Before examining the viability of a cause of action for reverse age 
discrimination under the ADEA, it is helpful to review the language and the 
legislative history of the statute.  What follows is a general overview of the 
ADEA, which focuses on the portions of the ADEA that are relevant to the 
discussion of reverse age discrimination. 
A. The Language of the ADEA 
The ADEA applies to private sector employers with twenty or more 
employees, labor unions, employment agencies, and the federal government.21  
The ADEA’s stated goals are to “promote employment of older persons based 
on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting 
problems arising from the impact of age on employment.”22  Under the ADEA, 
an employer cannot “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or 
otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 
age.”23  Section 631(a) of the ADEA provides that “any individual” means 
those individuals who are at least forty years of age.24 
Congress originally designated the protected class as persons between the 
ages of forty and sixty-five.25  Rather than imposing a general prohibition on 
 
 21. 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(a)–(d), 633(a) (2000). When the ADEA was first enacted, its coverage 
was limited to private employment.  Subsequent amendments in 1974 and 1978 extended the 
ADEA protection to state and federal employees.  See Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 28(a), 88 Stat. 55; Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, 92 Stat. 189. 
 22. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b). 
 23. Id. § 623(a)(1). The ADEA also makes it unlawful to “limit, segregate, or classify” 
employees in a manner that would deprive an employee of “employment opportunities or 
otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee” because of the individual’s age.  Id. § 
623(a)(2).  It is also unlawful under the ADEA to “reduce the wage rate of any employee in order 
to comply with this chapter.”  Id. § 623(a)(3). 
 24. Id. § 631(a). 
 25. Id.  See DAVID NEUMARK, AGE DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 
3 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8152, 2001), available at 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w8152. 
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age discrimination for all ages, Congress later raised the cap to age seventy26 
and eliminated the upper age limit altogether in 1986.27  The ADEA provides 
four statutory defenses for noncompliance.  First, it is permissible for 
employers to engage in age discrimination when an employee’s age is a “bona 
fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of 
the particular business.”28  Second, the employer may take action inconsistent 
with the ADEA proscriptions in order to comply with a “bona fide seniority 
system” or a “bona fide employee benefit plan.”29  Third, the employer may 
make discriminatory decisions if “the differentiation is based on reasonable 
factors other than age.”30  Fourth, the employer may discharge or discipline for 
good cause.31  In addition, the ADEA permits compulsory retirement at age 
sixty-five and older for employees who occupy a “bona fide executive” or a 
“high policymaking position” under certain circumstances.32 
The Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (“OWBPA”), which was signed 
into law in 1990,33 amended the ADEA and clarified that “‘compensation, 
terms, conditions or privileges of employment’ [under the ADEA] encompass 
all employee benefits, including [those] provided pursuant to a bona fide 
employee benefit plan.”34  The OWBPA also created a series of prerequisites 
for knowing and voluntary waivers of ADEA claims and imposed affirmative 
duties of disclosure and waiting periods.35 
B. Legislative History of the ADEA 
The ADEA was the last of three employment civil rights statutes passed 
during the 1960s.  It was preceded by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
 
 26. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3, 
92 Stat. 189, 189 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631 (2000)). 
 27. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 
2(c)(1), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (2000)). 
 28. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
 29. Id. § 623(f)(2)(A).  The seniority system must not be designed to evade the “purposes” 
of the ADEA, thus, no seniority system may impose involuntary retirement.  Id. 
 30. Id. § 623(f)(1). 
 31. Id. § 623(f)(3). 
 32. See id. § 631(c)(1). 
 33. Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 101-433, §1, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 630 (2000)). 
 34. See 29 U.S.C. § 630(l) (2000).  In addition, the Higher Education Amendments of 1998 
allow institutions of higher education to offer voluntary, age-based early retirement to tenured 
faculty without violating the ADEA.  See Higher Education Amendments of 1998, Pub. L. No. 
105-244, § 941, 112 Stat. 1581, 1834 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 623(m), (i)(6) 
(2000)). 
 35. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 626(f)(1)(B), (F)–(G) (2000). 
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1964,36 which prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, sex, or religion, and by the Equal Pay Act,37 which prohibits sex 
discrimination in wages.  Congress began studying the problem of age 
discrimination in employment in the 1950s.38  During the debates about the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress considered adding age as a protected class 
to be included under Title VII.39  When age discrimination provisions failed to 
pass, Congress directed the then Secretary of Labor, Willard Wirtz, to “make a 
full and complete study of the factors which might tend to result in 
discrimination in employment because of age and of the consequences of such 
discrimination on the economy and individuals affected.”40  One of the charges 
to Secretary Wirtz was to make a report that would include “recommendations 
for legislation to prevent arbitrary discrimination in employment because of 
age.”41 
Secretary Wirtz delivered his report to Congress on June 30, 1965.42  The 
Wirtz Report uncovered substantial evidence of “persistent and widespread use 
of age limits in hiring that in a great many cases can be attributed only to 
arbitrary discrimination against older workers on the basis of age and 
regardless of ability.”43  The main focus of the report was discrimination in 
hiring and its effects on unemployment among older adults.44  Secretary Wirtz 
found that more than half of all employers applied arbitrary age limits that 
 
 36. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88–352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2–17 (2000)). 
 37. Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 206(d) (2000)). 
 38. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 229 (1983) (discussing legislative history of the 
ADEA). 
 39. See Judith A. McMorrow, Retirement and Worker Choice: Incentives to Retire and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 B.C. L. REV. 347, 347 n.2 (1988) (citing Mayer G. 
Freed & Edwina Dowell, The Age of Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 6 
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 196, 196 (1972)). 
 40. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 715, 78 Stat. 241, 265 (repealed 1966). 
 41. Id.  See generally Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impact, in 
AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR 
LAWYERS AND PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 73–90 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982) (discussing the 
role of Secretary Wirtz’s report in shaping the ADEA). 
 42. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN 
EMPLOYMENT (1965) [hereinafter THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER], reprinted in U.S. EQUAL 
EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE AGE 
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT 16–41(1981) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]. 
 43. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42, at 21, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 37.  See also id. at 5 (finding significant evidence of “discrimination 
based on unsupported general assumptions about the effect of age on ability—in hiring practices 
that take the form of specific age limits applied to older workers as a group”), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 22. 
 44. Id. at 6–7, 18–19, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 23–24, 35–36. 
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were typically set from forty-five to fifty-five years of age,45 that workers over 
forty-five represented less than five percent of new hires for most 
establishments,46 and that one-fifth of employers hired no workers older than 
forty-five at all.47  Secretary Wirtz further found that a “significant proportion” 
of the age limits in effect were arbitrary in the sense that they had been 
established “without any determination of their actual relevance to job 
requirements” and were defended on pretextual grounds.48  The arbitrariness 
was underscored by the parallel finding that “[t]he competence and work 
performance of older workers are, by any general measures, at least equal to 
those of younger workers.”49  The Wirtz Report found that the consequences of 
such discrimination “embrace[d] a wide range of production loss, human 
hardship, and frustrations” and cost the economy billions of dollars.50 
The Wirtz Report also recognized some important differences between 
discrimination based on age and other types of discrimination.  The report 
emphasized that there is no antagonism on anyone’s part toward an older 
person.51  Rather, most common forms of discrimination against older workers 
involved inaccurate assumptions about the effects of age on their ability to do a 
job.52  The Wirtz Report recognized that, unlike with race, “not all 
discrimination in [the age] area is ‘arbitrary.’”53  Thus, the Wirtz Report did 
not recommend the broad-brush exclusions that are applicable to race 
discrimination; it recommended legislation that would eliminate discrimination 
based on stereotypes with particular focus on arbitrary age ceilings in hiring.54  
For example, in United States v. Florida Board of Regents, the United States 
explained: 
Between 1965 and 1967, Congress’s two relevant legislative committees and 
two select committees on aging conducted 18 days of hearings and compiled a 
record [that] consist[ed] of nearly 2100 pages of testimony and evidence 
 
 45. Id. at 6, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 23. 
 46. Id. at 6–7, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 23–24. 
 47. The OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42, at 7, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 24. 
 48. See id. (emphasis omitted), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 24. 
 49. Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 25. 
 50. Id. at 18, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 35. 
 51. Id. at 2, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 20. 
 52. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42, at 2, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 20.  See Blumrosen, supra note 41, at 79 (stating that “from the 
beginning, age discrimination was viewed as a different phenomena from race discrimination—a 
phenomena that did not flow from a long history of prejudice and subordination but rather, 
flowed from contemporary assumptions that individuals at a certain age lost the capacity to 
engage in certain activities”). 
 53. THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42, at 1, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 19. 
 54. Id. at 21–22, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 37–38. 
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[concerning] the problem[s] of age discrimination in employment and the need 
for a national legislative response.55 
Based on its findings, Congress enacted the ADEA in 1967.56  The ADEA 
represents a legislative compromise: the substantive provisions of the ADEA 
are derived from Title VII, while the enforcement scheme incorporates the 
procedures of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.57  The ADEA provides for 
backpay, benefits, reinstatement, and liquidated damages in cases of willful 
violations.58  In 1978, amendments to the ADEA “tolled the statute of 
limitations for an additional period up to one year, relaxed the notice 
requirements of the original Act, and expressly granted jury trials to resolve ‘a 
civil action in any court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or equitable 
relief as will effectuate the purposes of the ADEA.”59 
Senator Javits, the ADEA’s principal sponsor, emphasized the statute’s 
narrow scope.60  “We in America pride ourselves on our free enterprise 
system,” he declared, “particularly on the market as the only really objective 
test for the acceptance or rejection of the worth of goods or services.”61  
Senator Javits explained that the ADEA was designed not to displace market 
 
 55. Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) 
(Nos. 98-796, 98-791).  See, e.g., Employment Problems of Older Workers: Hearings Before the 
House Select Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor on H.R. 10634 and 
Similar Bills, 89th Cong. (1966); Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the House 
Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Educ. & Labor on H.R. 3651, H.R. 3768, and 
H.R. 4221, 90th Cong. (1967); Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the Senate 
Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor & Public Welfare on S. 830 and S. 788, 90th 
Cong. (1967); Retirement and the Individual: Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on 
Retirement and the Individual of the Senate Special Comm. on Aging, 90th Cong. (1967). 
 56. See H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 1 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 
42, at 74. 
 57. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 626, 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 
29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2000)).  Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a) (2000) (ADEA prohibitions), with 
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000) (Title VII prohibitions).  29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000) states that the 
ADEA “shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures” of fair labor 
standards.  See also H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 5–6 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, 
supra note 42, at 78–79. 
 58. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2000). 
 59. Mark J. Wolff, Sex, Race, and Age: Double Discrimination in Torts and Taxes, 78 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1341, 1420 (2000) (quoting Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 
U.S.C. § 626(c) (1994)) (footnotes omitted).  For information on the 1978 amendments 
referenced in the text, see Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. 
No. 95-256, § 4 (c), 92 Stat. 189, 191 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 626(e) (2000)) 
(extending the statute of limitations); § 4 (b), 92 Stat. at 190 (codified and amended at 29 U.S.C. 
§ 626(d) (2000)) (relaxing notice requirements); § 4 (a)(2), 92 Stat. at 190 (codified and amended 
at 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (2000)) (providing for jury trials). 
 60. 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 
145. 
 61. Id., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 145.  
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mechanisms but to counter the “widespread irrational belief that once men and 
women are past a certain age they are no longer capable of performing even 
some of the most routine jobs.”62 
III.  CASES IN THE CIRCUIT SPLIT 
A. Reverse Age Discrimination Not Actionable: Hamilton v. Caterpillar, 
Inc.63 
Hamilton was the first judicial interpretation of reverse age discrimination 
rendered on the appellate level.  Hamilton involved a class action brought 
against Caterpillar by a group of employees between the ages of forty and fifty 
who alleged that the employer had violated the ADEA by extending early 
retirement benefits only to employees fifty and older.64  The employer had 
closed two of its plants in Iowa and, as a result of negotiations with the union, 
offered a supplemental retirement plan to those employees fifty years and older 
who had worked for Caterpillar for ten or more years.65  Hamilton and other 
members of his class sued Caterpillar because “they were too young to qualify 
for early retirement benefits” and the only basis for their exclusion was their 
age.66 
The district court dismissed Hamilton’s claim, holding that the ADEA does 
not prohibit reverse age discrimination.67  The district court also held that, even 
if the ADEA did prohibit reverse discrimination, the special early retirement 
program at issue was a bona fide employee benefit plan protected by § 4(f)(2) 
of the ADEA.68  The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment 
of the district court based on its review of the first holding that there is no 
cause of action for reverse discrimination under the ADEA.69  Judge Cudahy 
wrote the Hamilton opinion for the unanimous panel.  In the absence of direct 
 
 62. Id., reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 145. 
 63. 966 F.2d 1226 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 64. Id. at 1227. 
 65. Id.  Caterpillar’s previous pension plan provided early retirement benefits to workers 
who were either “60 years or older with 10 years of service and to workers 55 years or older with 
terms of service, that, when added to their age, totaled 85.” Id. 
 66. Id. (emphasis omitted). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227.  See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (2000).  Furfaro and 
Josephson note that “[a]s in effect, at the time plaintiffs’ claims arose, [§ 4(f)(2)] provided 
employers a safe harbor from charges of discrimination based on actions taken pursuant to ‘any 
bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a 
subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the ADEA].’  This provision underwent significant revision 
in 1990.  Section 4(f)(2)(8)(ii) now provides a safe harbor for ‘voluntary early retirement 
incentive plan(s) consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes of this chapter.’”  Furfaro & 
Josephson, supra note 9, at 8 n.4. 
 69. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. 
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precedent on point, the court relied on dicta from the Seventh Circuit in Karlen 
v. City Colleges of Chicago and the First Circuit in Schuler v. Polaroid Corp. 
Seventh and First Circuit decisions.70 
In the Seventh Circuit case of Karlen v. City Colleges of Chicago, the 
plaintiffs were three professors who challenged an early retirement program 
that was open to faculty members between the ages of fifty-five and sixty-nine 
who had been continuously employed full-time for at least ten years.71  The 
complaint alleged that the plan violated the ADEA because it provided lower 
sick pay for faculty members retiring after age sixty-five and eliminated group 
insurance coverage for faculty members retiring after age sixty-five.72  In his 
opinion in Karlen, Judge Posner examined the issue of the proper treatment of 
early retirement plans under the ADEA and noted that those plans involve 
discrimination in favor of, rather than against, older workers.73  Far from being 
arbitrary discrimination, such plans give older workers a prized option “only 
slightly tarnished by the knowledge that sometimes employers offer it because 
they want to ease out older workers.”74 
Although the retirement plan in Karlen favored younger employees and the 
plaintiffs did not claim reverse discrimination, Judge Posner stated that “an 
early retirement plan that treats you better the older you are is not suspect 
under the [ADEA].”75  Judge Posner opined that, unlike Title VII, which does 
not differentiate within the protected class, the ADEA “does not protect the 
young as well as the old, or even, we think, the younger against the older.”76  
To further illustrate this point, Judge Posner noted that allowing workers older 
than forty but younger than the age of eligibility for early retirement to 
challenge Early Retirement Incentive Plans (ERIPs)77 would result in ERIPs 
being outlawed, which was not the intent of Congress when adopting the 
ADEA.78  Under those circumstances, the employer “could be confident of 
 
 70. Id. at 1227. 
 71. Karlen v. City Colls. of Chi., 837 F.2d 314, 315–16 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 486 
U.S. 1044 (1988). 
 72. Id. at 316. 
 73. Id. at 317. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 318. 
 76. Karlen, 837 F.2d at 318 (emphasis omitted). 
 77. ERIP is a commonly used acronym for Early Retirement Incentive Plan.  ERIPs often 
consist of “a one-time lump payment to induce an older worker to retire voluntarily.”  Samuel 
Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age Discrimination?: The 
ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 814 (1997). 
 78. Id. 
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escaping liability . . . only by allowing retirement at age 40!”79  Such result, in 
the words of Judge Posner, would be nothing but “reductio ad absurdum.”80 
Another case cited with approval by the Hamilton court was the First 
Circuit’s decision in Schuler v. Polaroid Corp.81  Polaroid, during the course of 
a workforce reduction, eliminated the position held by the fifty-seven-year-old 
plaintiff.  The plaintiff accepted the severance plan and retired, but brought a 
suit against the employer alleging a violation of the ADEA.  The plaintiff 
alleged that the employer had forced him to accept the severance package and 
leave because of his age.82  Before addressing the merits of the plaintiff’s age 
discrimination claim, the court discussed whether a severance plan could serve 
as a basis of the plaintiff’s claim.83  The court dismissed the idea that the 
plaintiff can “base his ‘age discrimination’ claim upon the attractive terms that 
the severance plan offered” because the plan itself was “a carrot, not a stick.”84  
The court further stated that the ADEA “does not forbid treating older persons 
more generously than others.”85 
The Hamilton court began its analysis by pointing out that every court that 
ever considered the issue of reverse age discrimination indicated that younger 
workers had no cause of action under the ADEA.86  The court disagreed with 
the plaintiff’s argument that age discrimination is analogous to race or sex 
discrimination and “cuts both ways.”87  The court distinguished race and sex 
from age because age is not immutable, nor does it arise from birth.88  The 
court found nothing in the legislative history of the ADEA to even suggest that 
“Congress believed age to be the equal of youth in the sense that the races and 
sexes are deemed to be equal.”89 
The next factor examined by the court was the age limit contained in the 
ADEA.  The court reasoned that, by allowing only individuals forty years or 
older to sue under the ADEA, Congress did not intend to prevent reverse 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. Reductio ad absurdum is translated from Latin as “reduction to the absurd,” basically 
meaning disproof of an argument by showing that it leads to a ridiculous conclusion.  BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1283 (7th ed. 1999). 
 81. Schuler v. Polaroid Corp., 848 F.2d 276 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 82. Id. at 277–78. 
 83. Id. at 278. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. (emphasis omitted).  The Schuler court found that the plaintiff could not establish a 
prima facie case of age discrimination because he was not replaced by a younger person, “rather, 
his position was effectively abolished.”  Id.  See also State Police for Automatic Ret. Ass’n v. 
DiFava, 317 F.3d 6, 15 (1st Cir. 2003) (citing Schuler with approval for the proposition that the 
ADEA allows preferential treatment of older employees). 
 86. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
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discrimination.90  The court considered the EEOC regulations that provide that 
“[i]t is unlawful . . . to discriminate . . . by giving preference because of age 
between individuals 40 and over.”91  The regulations also offer an example of 
prohibited discrimination: if the victim is forty-two years old and his or her 
competitor is fifty-two, an employment decision cannot be made on the basis 
of either age.92  The court noted that in the only two instances this regulation 
had been referenced in case law, it was cited for the proposition that “an older 
plaintiff may maintain a cause of action under the ADEA even if his 
replacement is over 40.”93  The court concluded that, to the extent that the 
EEOC regulation authorizes a cause of action for reverse age discrimination, 
“it exceeds the scope of the statute.”94 
Turning to the language of the ADEA, the court in Hamilton 
acknowledged that phrases like “because of such individual’s age” and “on the 
basis of such individual’s age” might be read to prohibit consideration of age 
per se in employment decisions.95  However, the court pointed out that 
congressional findings that precede the statement of purpose in § 621 “refer 
specifically to the problems faced by ‘older workers’ and ‘older persons.’”96  
Taking the context and the legislative history of the statute into account, the 
court expressed its conviction that Congress was not concerned about the 
plight of workers who were discriminated against because they were too 
young.97  The crucial feature of age discrimination—the arbitrary denial of 
work opportunities on the basis of inaccurate stereotypes—was missing in the 
case of younger workers.98  The court compared younger workers to the non-
handicapped, stating that younger workers “cannot argue that they are similarly 
victimized.”99 
The court’s analysis led it to conclude that Congress could have used 
overinclusive language.100  The court suggested that Congress might have used 
such phrases as “because such individual is older” or “on the basis of such 
 
 90. Id. 
 91. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1227.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2002) (interpreting 
discrimination between individuals protected by the ADEA). 
 92. Id. (stating that “if two people apply for the same position, and one is 42 and the other 
52, the employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but must make such 
decision on the basis of some other factor”). 
 93. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228 (citing LaMontagne v. Am. Convenience Prods., Inc., 750 
F.2d 1405, 1411 n.4 (7th Cir. 1984); Miller v. Lyng, 660 F. Supp. 1375, 1377–78 n.2 (D.D.C. 
1987)). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1228 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 623 (a)(1), (a)(2), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2)). 
 96. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 (a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3)). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. 
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individual’s advancing age,” but had used a more “economical” and “graceful” 
language.101  Finally, the court stated that it was “unwilling to open the 
floodgates” of litigation attacking every retirement plan and dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ complaint.102 
Hamilton produced little commentary, and the only criticism focused on 
the Hamilton court’s approach to statutory construction.103  Hamilton’s 
approach to interpreting the ADEA does seem somewhat result-oriented.  In an 
opinion that barely exceeds two pages, the court gave little consideration to the 
plain language of the ADEA.  Instead, the court read the central prohibition of 
the statute narrowly, in effect limiting the scope of the ADEA’s application to 
discrimination “against older people on the basis of their age.”  The court’s 
treatment of legislative history is not overly impressive either as the court did 
not cite to any specific portions of the congressional record for support of the 
proposition that Congress was less concerned about the plight of the younger 
workers within the protected category. 
The strongest parts of the Hamilton opinion deal with the entire context of 
the ADEA and the central goal of the statute to prohibit arbitrary age 
discrimination.  The court believed that allowing reverse discrimination claims 
would run contrary to the congressional purpose of the ADEA.104  The 
Hamilton court clearly viewed the phenomenon of age discrimination as 
separate and distinct from any other kind of discrimination.105  The court’s 
concern about opening the floodgates of litigation is also well taken because 
allowing the cause of action for reverse discrimination would dramatically 
increase the reach of the ADEA.106 
Following Hamilton, several courts rejected claims of reverse 
discrimination.107  These courts accepted Hamilton as a practical and common 
sense approach to the problem of reverse discrimination.108  The reasoning of 
these courts, however, added little to the understanding of the judicial 
interpretation of reverse discrimination, as none of the courts delved deeply 
into analysis.  While some of the courts expressly relied on Hamilton for the 
proposition that reverse age discrimination is not actionable under the 
 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. See, e.g., Several Recent Circuit Court Cases Clarify the Application of the ADEA to 
Employee Benefit Plans, ERISA LITIG. REP., Oct. 1992, at 7, 9 (characterizing Hamilton “a rather 
remarkable bit of statutory analysis”). 
 104. Hamilton, 966 F.2d at 1228. 
 105. Id. at 1227 (distinguishing age discrimination from race and sex discrimination). 
 106. See discussion Part VI infra. 
 107. E.g., Stone v. Travelers Corp., 58 F.3d 434, 437 (9th Cir. 1995); Greer v. Pension 
Benefit Guar. Corp., No. 00 CIV 1272 SAS, 2001 WL 137330, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Feb 15, 2001); 
Dittman v. Gen. Motors Corp., 941 F. Supp. 284, 287 (D. Conn. 1996), aff’d, 116 F.3d 465 (2d 
Cir. 1997); Parker v. Wakelin, 882 F. Supp. 1131, 1140–41 (D. Me. 1995). 
 108. See, e.g., Greer, 2001 WL 137330, at *4. 
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ADEA,109 other courts dismissed plaintiffs’ claims on alternative grounds.110  
For example, the Ninth Circuit in Stone v. Travelers Corp. rejected a reverse 
age discrimination claim under the ADEA that was based on an additional 
form of Voluntary Severance Option (VSO) made available to employees older 
than fifty-five.111  In Stone, a fifty-two-year-old employee was given a choice 
of receiving his VSO as a lump sum or in monthly installments, while 
employees older than fifty-five could also receive their severance benefits in 
the form of a lifetime annuity.112  Although the court found the plaintiff’s 
claim of age discrimination to be “unusual,” it rendered its judgment on a 
narrower statutory ground than the Hamilton court.113  The court in Stone 
determined that the ADEA barred the plaintiff’s claim because it specifies that 
the employer does not violate the statute solely because “‘an employee pension 
benefit plan . . . provides for the attainment of a minimum age as a condition of 
eligibility.’”114 
B. Reverse Age Discrimination Actionable: Cline v. General Dynamics Land 
Systems, Inc.115 
Before Cline, two circuits laid the groundwork for allowing reverse age 
discrimination claims under the ADEA.  The Tenth Circuit in Greene v. 
Safeway Stores, Inc., reversed the grant of judgment as a matter of law to the 
defendant-employer despite the fact that the replacement worker chosen by the 
employer was five years older than the plaintiff.116  The Greene court 
 
 109. E.g., Lawrence v. Town of Irondequoit, 246 F. Supp. 2d 150, 161 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(citing Hamilton to support its dismissal of plaintiff’s claim based on reduction of retirement 
health care benefits only for people younger than eighty); Greer, 2001 WL 137330, at *4 (relying 
on Hamilton and Dittman to grant summary judgment for the employer); Dittman, 941 F. Supp. at 
287 (citing Hamilton to support its conclusion that the “ADEA does not bar discrimination of the 
young in favor of the old”); Parker, 882 F. Supp. at 1140–41 (stating that it was only 
discrimination in favor of younger individuals that the law is designed to prohibit and then 
referencing the holding of Hamilton).  As of this writing, the latest court pronouncement on the 
issue of reverse age discrimination also relied on Hamilton as precedent.  See Feigl v. Ecolab, 
Inc., No. 03 C 2290, 2003 WL 22096506 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 2003). 
 110. E.g., Stone, 58 F.3d at 437. 
 111. Id. at 436. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 437. 
 114. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(l)(1)(A) (2000)).  See also Dittman, 941 F. Supp. at 286–87 
(holding that the minimum age requirement in the ERIP that was available to employees fifty 
years and older was permissible under the plain language of section 623(l)(1)(A) of the ADEA).  
But see Edwards v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 2 F.3d 382, 383 (11th Cir. 1993) 
(sidestepping the issue of whether “reverse discrimination is, as a matter of law, ever covered by 
the ADEA”). 
 115. 296 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003). 
 116. 98 F.3d 554, 556–62 (10th Cir. 1996) (fifty-two year old replaced by fifty-seven year 
old). 
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acknowledged that in order to satisfy the fourth element of the McDonnell 
Douglas prima facie case,117 plaintiff must ordinarily prove that a younger 
person replaced him or her.118  The court reasoned, however, that the 
McDonnell Douglas approach is flexible and a plaintiff may be relieved of 
satisfying all four elements in an extraordinary case.119 
The Tenth Circuit proceeded to examine the evidence of discrimination 
outside of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie proof scheme.120  The court 
focused its inquiry on “whether Greene met ‘his burden directly, by presenting 
direct or circumstantial evidence that age was a determining factor in his 
discharge.’”121  The court weighed such evidence as the replacement of eight 
senior executives older than fifty with younger employees, positive feedback 
that the plaintiff received from management throughout his tenure, and certain 
statements made by the company president to Greene regarding Greene’s 
inability to “fit with the new culture.”122  The court reasoned that by replacing 
the plaintiff with an older executive, the employer may have been creating a 
temporary replacement for the plaintiff.123  The older replacement could have 
been hired just to ward off a discrimination suit under the ADEA.124  The court 
thus concluded that “evidentiary showings altogether raised a fact question for 
the jury which could justify the trier of fact in disregarding [the] status [of] an 
older replacement and in nevertheless finding age discrimination.”125  
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Douglas v. Anderson stated in dicta that 
replacement by an older employee does not necessarily foreclose prima facie 
evidence of discrimination “if other direct or circumstantial evidence supports 
an inference of discrimination.”126 
 
 117. The four-part evidentiary procedure used in discrimination cases was introduced by the 
Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green to allow plaintiffs, in cases of indirect 
discrimination, to establish an inference of discrimination and reallocate the burden of production 
to the defendant.  See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  In the 
context of a Title VII race-discrimination case, the plaintiff must carry the initial burden of 
establishing a prima facie case by showing the following: 
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for 
which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was 
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer 
continued to seek applicants from persons of [the] complainant’s qualifications. 
Id. 
 118. Greene, 98 F.3d at 559 (citing Lucas v. Dover Corp., 857 F.2d 1397, 1400 (10th Cir. 
1988)). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 559–60. 
 121. Id. at 560 (quoting Lucas, 857 F.2d at 1400). 
 122. Id. at 560–61. 
 123. Greene, 98 F.3d at 561. 
 124. Id. (quoting Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1013 n.9 (1st Cir. 1979)). 
 125. Id. at 562. 
 126. 656 F.2d 528, 533 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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The Cline court squarely faced the issue of reverse discrimination.  Cline 
and 195 other workers at General Dynamics Land Systems filed a class-action 
lawsuit against the company after it entered into a new collective bargaining 
agreement (“CBA2”) with the United Auto Workers.127  While a previous 
agreement that was in effect until July 1, 1997, required General Dynamics to 
provide full health benefits to retired workers with thirty years of seniority, 
CBA2 allowed the company to exclude retirees from receiving full health 
benefits.128  The benefits were eliminated with one exception providing that 
those employees who were fifty years or older at the time CBA2 took effect 
would still be eligible to receive full health benefits upon retirement.129  Cline 
and other employees in the forty to forty-nine-year-old age group alleged that 
the provision of health benefits given only to the future retirees who were, at 
the time, older than fifty violated the ADEA and the Ohio Civil Rights Act 
because it discriminated against the employees between the ages of forty and 
forty-nine solely on the basis of their age.130 
The district court granted General Dynamics’s motion to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ claim.131  The lower court acknowledged that CBA2 “facially 
discriminated” by creating two classes of employees based solely on age.132  
The court concluded, however, that the ADEA does not allow claims for 
“reverse discrimination” because the statute was drafted to aid “older workers, 
not workers who suffer discrimination because they are too young.”133  In 
declining to recognize the claim for reverse discrimination, the district court 
relied on the established jurisprudence of other federal courts that held that “a 
claim of reverse age discrimination is not cognizable under [the] ADEA.”134  
The district court also interpreted the plaintiffs’ argument as a claim that they 
were wrongfully denied existing job benefits on the basis of age.135  The 
district court reasoned that under the Employee Retirement Income Security 
Act of 1974 (ERISA),136 the provision of health benefits was part of a welfare 
benefit plan that the company was not obligated to provide to all employees.137  
 
 127. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 467 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. 
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003). 
 128. Id. at 468. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 98 F. Supp. 2d. 846, 848 (N.D. Ohio 2000). 
 132. Id. at 848. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1001–1461 (2000)). 
 137. Cline, 98 F. Supp. 2d at 848. 
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The court stated that it would have been permissible to withhold retiree health 
benefits from all employees under the CBA2.138 
1. Majority Opinion in Cline 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded 
Cline for further proceedings.139  The three-member panel produced a majority 
opinion written by Judge Ryan and joined by Judge Cole, a separate concurring 
opinion by Judge Cole, and a dissenting opinion by Judge Williams, a district 
court judge from Virginia sitting by designation.140  The split decision 
“underscores the controversial nature of a reverse discrimination claim under 
the ADEA.”141 
The panel engaged in a lengthy analysis of the statutory language and 
focused on the “plain language” of the ADEA.142  Judge Ryan stressed that 
there was no reason to resort to legislative history in order to ascertain the 
meaning of the ADEA because the language of the statute is “plain and 
unambiguous.”143  In reviewing the language of § 623(a)(1) and § 631(a) of the 
ADEA, the majority found that the wording of these sections prohibited an 
employer from discriminating against “any individual” forty years of age or 
older based on that person’s age.144  Judge Ryan emphasized that the use of the 
phrase “any individual” in the language of the statute indicated that the law 
was designed to equally protect all workers over forty, not just those at the 
higher end of the age spectrum.145  He stated that, contrary to the conclusion of 
the district court, “any individual” could not be read to mean “older 
workers.”146  Judge Ryan also noted that “the fact that some members within 
the protected class were beneficiaries of the discriminatory action of which 
other members of the protected class—the plaintiffs—were victims, does not 
somehow suspend the language of the statute, which prohibits age 
discrimination against ‘any individual’ within the protected class.”147 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003). 
 140. Id. at 467; see also David L. Hudson, Older Workers Claim Age Bias in Favor of Elders, 
A.B.A. J. E-REPORT, Aug. 2, 2002, at 4. 
 141. ADEA-Protected Workers Can Sue for ‘Reverse Discrimination’ Regarding Retiree 
Health Coverage Under 6th Circuit Ruling, at http://www.thompson.com/libraries/benefits/self/ 
samplenews/self0210a.html (Oct. 2002). 
 142. Cline, 296 F.3d at 469. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Id. (stating that § 623(a)(1) contained a clear and unambiguous prohibition “from 
defining the terms and benefits of . . . employment based solely on . . . age”). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Cline, 296 F.3d at 472. 
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Congress’s reference to “older persons” and “older workers” in the 
ADEA’s Statement of Finding and Purpose did not alter the majority’s 
analysis.  Judge Ryan criticized the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Hamilton for 
its reliance on the “hortatory, generalized language of Congress’s Statement of 
Findings and Purpose in the ADEA,” and insisted that the specific language of 
the statute should override the more generalized.148  In addition, Judge Ryan 
relied on the EEOC’s interpretations as being true to the statutory language 
because the EEOC determined in its guidelines that age discrimination within 
the protected class is unlawful regardless of the parties’ respective ages.149 
Judge Ryan insisted that the Cline case was not one of “reverse 
discrimination” because the term “has no ascertainable meaning in the law.”150  
He explained that “[a]n action is either discriminatory or it is not 
discriminatory, and some discriminatory actions are prohibited by law.”151  
Judge Ryan reiterated his concern about courts “address[ing] perceived 
inadequacies” in statutes and derided the district court for having engaged in 
an interpretive reading of the ADEA.152  In Judge Ryan’s view, the district 
court redrafted the statute by substituting for “any individual” the term “older 
workers” and referring only to “relatively older” employees within the 
protected group.153  Judge Ryan further added that “[i]f Congress wanted to 
limit the ADEA to protect only those workers who are relatively older, it 
clearly had the power and acuity to do so,” but it did not.154  Thus, the Sixth 
Circuit held that CBA2 “denied a group of employees within the protected 
class an employee benefit based solely on [the employees’] age” and therefore 
violated the ADEA.155 
2. Concurring Opinion in Cline 
Judge Cole voiced “doubts as to whether Congress specifically intended” 
to allow reverse age discrimination claims.156  The text and the structure of the 
ADEA indicated to Judge Cole that Congress’s main goal was to prohibit age 
discrimination that favors younger over older employees.157  Judge Cole 
reasoned, however, “that Congress’s choice of language, whether specifically 
intended or not, also prohibits age discrimination that favors older over 
 
 148. Id. at 470. 
 149. Id. at 471 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2000)).  See supra note 91. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Cline, 296 F.3d at 469. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 472. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. (Cole, J., concurring). 
 157. Cline, 296 F.3d at 472–73 (Cole, J., concurring). 
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younger protected employees.”158  While conceding that the court’s plain 
language interpretation was counterintuitive, Judge Cole insisted that the Cline 
decision was in line with existing canons of statutory construction.159 
Judge Cole found that none of the exceptions to the plain meaning rule 
were implicated in the case of reverse discrimination under the ADEA.160  He 
found the text of § 623 and § 631 to be unequivocal in the general prohibition 
of discrimination based on age.161  Stating that reference to “older workers” in 
§ 621(a) was “at most ambiguous,” he found “no definite inconsistency” 
between the literal interpretation of § 623 and § 631 and the language of § 
621(a).162  Judge Cole also determined that congressional intent would not be 
undermined by allowing a cause of action for reverse discrimination because 
more favorable treatment by employers of older workers “furthers . . . arbitrary 
age discrimination in employment.”163 
Judge Cole rejected the social policy implications of allowing reverse 
discrimination claims under the ADEA and opined that such an interpretation 
of the statute would not lead to absurd results.164  He illustrated his point by 
citing to several state court decisions that interpreted state anti-discrimination 
laws to allow reverse discrimination suits.165  Judge Cole also attempted to 
reconcile the decision in Cline with the Supreme Court’s decision in O’Connor 
v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp.166  In O’Connor, the Supreme Court 
ruled that an ADEA plaintiff seeking to prove discrimination based upon 
indirect evidence is not required to demonstrate that he or she was replaced by 
a person outside of the protected class.167  The Court suggested instead that a 
plaintiff may show, as part of the prima facie case, that he or she was replaced 
by a person “substantially younger.”168  Judge Cole distinguished O’Connor on 
the basis that Cline was a direct evidence case that did not rely upon the prima 
 
 158. Id. at 472. 
 159. Id. at 472–73, 476.  Departures from the “plain meaning” rule of statutory construction 
are authorized in the Sixth Circuit “(1) where the text is ambiguous; (2) where a literal reading is 
inconsistent with other statutory provisions; (3) where a plain language reading is inconsistent 
with congressional intent; [or] (4) where the plain statutory meaning leads to absurd results.”  Id. 
at 473 (citing Vergos v. Gregg’s Enters., Inc., 159 F.3d 989, 990 (6th Cir. 1998)). 
 160. Id. at 473. 
 161. Id. 
 162. Cline, 296 F.3d at 473 (Cole, J., concurring). 
 163. Id. at 474. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 474–75. 
 166. Id. at 472, 475. 
 167. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996). 
 168. Id. 
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facie test169 and on the basis that the Supreme Court did not address reverse 
discrimination in O’Connor.170 
3. Dissenting Opinion in Cline 
Dissenting, Judge Williams emphasized that “no court in the nation has 
recognized a claim for [reverse] age discrimination under the ADEA.”171  
Judge Williams stressed that the purpose of the ADEA is to alleviate problems 
faced by older workers, not the problems of younger ones, especially if they 
are in the same protected class.172  Section 621 of the statute refers to “older 
workers” and “older persons,” which indicated to Judge Williams that 
Congress meant to prohibit employers from discriminating against older 
workers as opposed to younger ones.173  Judge Williams found the reasoning of 
the Hamilton court to be persuasive.174  Relying on the Seventh Circuit holding 
in Hamilton, Judge Williams stressed the difference between age, which arises 
from birth and is not immutable, and other protected categories such as race or 
sex.175 
Judge Williams also noted that the Sixth Circuit’s decision “potentially 
could have a devastating effect on the collective bargaining process, calling 
into question the validity of seniority and early retirement programs contained 
in collective bargaining agreements across the country.”176  Judge Williams 
also argued that a “common sense” understanding of the collective bargaining 
agreement, which provided for the change in retiree health benefits, 
necessitated a conclusion that “the ADEA was not intended to interfere with 
the collective bargaining process or with collective bargaining agreements.”177  
 
 169. Cline, 296 F.3d at 475.  The ADEA disparate treatment claims can be based either on 
direct or indirect evidence.  See Hein v. All Am. Plywood Co., 232 F.3d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 2000).  
Direct evidence of discrimination is such “evidence which, if believed, would prove the existence 
of [unlawful discrimination] without any inferences or presumptions.”  Bodenheimer v. PPG 
Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993).  An example of direct evidence of a discriminatory 
intent is a facially-discriminatory employment policy, such as the policy giving preferential 
treatment to workers older than fifty in Cline.  The four-part prima facie framework of 
McDonnell Douglas is inapplicable in direct evidence cases.  Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. 
Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).  For discussion of the McDonnell Douglas evidentiary 
framework, see supra note 117. 
 170. Cline, 296 F.3d at 475 (Cole, J., concurring). 
 171. Id. at 476 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Cline, 296 F.3d at 476 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 176. Id. at 476. 
 177. Id. 
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It was apparent to Judge Williams that the needs of older people increase with 
age, thus necessitating increased protection or increased benefits.178 
IV.  CRITICAL EVALUATION OF CLINE 
A. Statutory Construction 
At the core of the court’s reasoning in Cline, and the split decision that the 
Cline court produced, lies a basic dispute about the proper approach to 
statutory construction.  The two main approaches to statutory interpretation are 
the plain-meaning rule and the approach that takes into account the purposes 
behind the statute and its legislative history.  It is well accepted that courts 
“‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’”179  
The issue of how to determine what constitutes ambiguity is less certain, as the 
Supreme Court has provided several criteria to determine ambiguity.180  Under 
certain circumstances, for the statute to be unambiguous “[i]t need only be 
‘plain to anyone reading the Act’ that the statute encompasses the conduct at 
issue.”181  However, the “plainness or ambiguity of statutory language” 
sometimes amounts to a complicated inquiry that takes into account “the 
language itself, the specific context in which that language is used, and the 
broader context of the statute as a whole.”182 
If the statutory language is not manifestly unambiguous, the inquiry does 
not cease but proceeds to an examination of the statutory scheme to see if it is 
“‘coherent and consistent.’”183  In doing so, “absurd results are to be avoided 
and [the] internal inconsistencies in the statute must be dealt with.”184  When 
the plain meaning of a statute is not clear, legislative history becomes 
important in an attempt to divine congressional intent.  Although Justice Scalia 
has vehemently opposed the use of legislative history in statutory 
 
 178. Id. 
 179. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Co. v. Comm’r, 523 U.S. 382, 387 (1998) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)). 
 180. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 534 U.S. 84, 94 (2001) (stating that specific 
canons of statutory construction “‘are often countered . . . by some maxim pointing in a different 
direction’”) (quoting Circuit City Stores v. Adams, Inc., 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001)). 
 181. Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 60 (1997) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 
452, 467 (1991)). 
 182. Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337, 341 (1997). 
 183. Id. at 340 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989)). 
 184. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580 (1981). 
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interpretation,185 the majority of the Supreme Court finds legislative history 
instructive when interpreting statutes.186 
Even when faced with a civil rights statute that seems unambiguous on its 
face, the Supreme Court has, in the past, engaged in an interpretive reading of 
the statute.  One of the familiar examples is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,187 
which involved a sweeping reconceptualization of Title VII.  In Griggs, the 
Supreme Court enunciated a disparate impact theory of discrimination, finding 
that Title VII “proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that 
are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation.”188  While the Supreme Court 
in Griggs increased the reach of Title VII, in other cases it has narrowed the 
scope of the statute’s coverage.189 
The majority and concurrence in Cline insisted that the plain meaning of 
the ADEA commands that the court should not look outside the statute itself.190  
The Cline majority’s strident opposition to the idea of having to engage in an 
interpretive reading of the statute seems misplaced.  That the panel itself was 
split regarding the breadth of the ADEA’s reach confirms the fact that the 
language of the statute is anything but plain.  That reasonable minds could 
differ regarding the meaning of the ADEA prohibition is also manifest in the 
diametrically opposing views of the Seventh and Sixth Circuits. 
The Cline court’s rigid application of the plain-meaning rule, while 
completely ignoring congressional intent, is an extreme example of the 
textualist approach to statutory interpretation.191  The logic of the majority can 
 
 185. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States 
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: 
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 29–37 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997). 
 186. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pa., 458 U.S. 375, 384–91 (1982) (relying on 
the legislative history of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 to hold that 42 U.S.C. § 1981 can be 
violated only by purposeful discrimination). 
 187. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). 
 188. Id. at 431. 
 189. E.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481–84 (1999).  See Wendy E. 
Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the Meaning of 
Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 54 (2000) (arguing that the Supreme Court in 
Sutton narrowed the scope of the Americans with Disabilities Act and disregarded the legislative 
history and the guidance provided by administrative interpretations of the statute).  See also infra 
notes 185–188 and accompanying text. 
 190. See supra Parts III.B.1–2 for a discussion of the majority and concurring opinions in 
Cline. 
 191. Recent Case, Cline v. General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc., 296 F.3d 466 (6th Cir. 
2002), 116 HARV. L. REV. 1533 passim (2003).  The textualist approach to statutory construction 
is embodied in the views of Justice Scalia who advocates the “plain meaning” view.  See Parmet, 
supra note 189, at 68–69.  Under the textualist approach, “[w]hen the particular words at issue are 
not completely clear, their meaning may be discerned by analysis of the statute’s text as a whole, 
dictionaries, grammar books, and the traditional common law canons of statutory construction.”  
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be boiled down to a syllogism that Judge Ryan himself found amusing: “The 
ADEA expressly prohibits denying any employee within the protected class an 
employment benefit solely because of age.  The CBA2 provision . . . denies . . . 
[such] benefit based solely on [the employee’s] age.  Therefore, the ADEA 
prohibits the CBA2 provision in question.”192  Courts, however, are charged 
with an infinitely more difficult task than applying syllogisms when it comes 
to statutory construction: “As in all cases of statutory construction, [the 
court’s] task is to interpret the words of [the statute] in light of the purposes 
Congress sought to serve.”193 
B. The Language of the ADEA: 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) and § 631(a)(2) 
The categorical prohibition of discrimination “because of [an] individual’s 
age”194 in § 623(a)(1) of the ADEA may suggest that the prohibition applies 
symmetrically to the members of the protected group.  Certainly, the literal 
reading of this section would lead to this conclusion.  Moreover, there is some 
arguable support for this position in other portions of the statute as well.  
Phrases like “because of such individual’s age,” “on the basis of such 
individual’s age,” or “because of his age,” if read literally, lend themselves to 
an interpretation that absolutely prohibits the use of age as a factor in 
employment decisions.195 
In concluding that the prohibition against discrimination based on age 
encompasses discrimination against the older and the younger cohorts, the 
majority in Cline never considered the various meanings commonly ascribed to 
the word “age.”  The Cline court simply assumed that “age” means 
“chronological age.”  Most dictionaries, in fact, do offer “the length of time 
during which a being or thing has lived or existed” as the most common 
definition of “age.”196  The word “age,” however, has many alternative 
meanings.197  Among the accepted meanings are the “quality or state of being 
 
Id. at 69 (footnotes omitted).  Textualists eschew references to legislative history and statutory 
goals for fear of interjecting the judges own policy preferences into the law.  Id. 
 192. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 472 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003). 
 193. Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608 (1979). 
 194. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000). 
 195. See id. § 623(a)(1), (a)(2), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2); Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 
1226, 1228 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 196. E.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE 40 (1993).  See also THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 176 (1961) (defining age as 
“[a] period of existence” and “[t]he whole duration of . . . existence”). 
 197. “Age” has been variously defined.  E.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 40 (1993) (defining age as “the time of life at which 
one becomes naturally or conventionally qualified or disqualified for something” and “a measure 
of the development, capacity, condition, or quality of an individual”); THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 176 (1961) (defining age as “[a] naturally distinct portion of the existence of a man 
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old,”198 “[t]he latter part of life, when the physical effects of protracted 
existence become apparent; old age,”199 or “state of having lived long.”200  
Common to all these definitions is that age is viewed as a state relative to 
youth or younger generations as well as the connotation of advancement and 
maturity associated with the word “age.” 
The use of dictionary meanings of words in construing legislation is a 
common practice for the courts.201  While by no means “substitute[s] for close 
analysis of what words mean as used in a particular statutory context,”202 
dictionaries are useful in statutory construction.  The existence of alternative 
definitions of the word “age” supports the proposition that the wording of the 
ADEA is open to interpretation.203  By failing to include the alternative 
meanings of the word “age” in its construction of the statutory prohibition 
against age discrimination, the Sixth Circuit departed from the plain meaning 
approach that it espoused. 
Instead of focusing on the meanings of the word “age” in interpreting the 
statute, the Cline majority relied heavily on the ADEA’s references to 
“individuals” as opposed to groups.204 The Supreme Court’s decision in 
O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp. is instructive in understanding 
the weight that the Supreme Court assigns to the ADEA prohibition of 
discrimination against an “individual.”  In O’Connor, the Supreme Court 
 
or other being,” and “a generation”); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 24–25 
(3d ed. 2000) (defining age as “one of the stages of life,” and “the period of history during which 
a person lives”). 
 198. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 
40 (1993).  See also THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 24–25 (3d ed. 2000) 
(defining age as “[t]he state of being old”). 
 199. THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 176 (1961).  See also THE OXFORD REFERENCE 
DICTIONARY 11 (1989) (defining age as “the later part of life, old age”); WEBSTER’S II NEW 
COLLEGE DICTIONARY 21 (1995) (defining age as “[t]he latter portion of life”). 
 200. ENCARTA WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, at http://encarta.msn.com/encnet/features/ 
dictionary/dictionaryhome.aspx (2003). 
 201. See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. AT&T Co., 512 U.S. 218, 225–27 (1994) (considering 
dictionary definitions of the word “modify” in interpreting the Communications Act); Nat’l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S. 407, 417–19 (1992) (reviewing various 
dictionary definitions of the word “required” in interpreting condemnation provisions of the Rail 
Passenger Service Act).  See also Note, Looking it Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 1437, 1437 (1994) (finding that “the Supreme Court has referred to 
dictionaries in more than six hundred cases over a period of two centuries”). 
 202. MCI Telecomms., 512 U.S. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 203. See id. at 227 (stating that “[m]ost cases of verbal ambiguity in statutes involve . . . a 
selection between accepted alternative meanings shown as such by many dictionaries”); Nat’l 
R.R. Passenger Corp., 503 U.S. at 418 (stating that “[t]he existence of alternative dictionary 
definitions . . . each making sense under the statute, itself indicates that the statute is open to 
interpretation”). 
 204. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 469–70 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003). 
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considered whether an employee “must show that he was replaced by someone 
outside the age group protected by the ADEA to make out a prima facie case” 
of age discrimination.205  The plaintiff was fifty-six years old when he was 
fired and replaced by a forty-year-old.206  The district court found that the 
plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas 
framework because he had produced no evidence that he was replaced with a 
person outside the protected class.207  The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s dismissal of the case and held that an ADEA plaintiff must prove that 
he was replaced by an individual with comparable qualifications who is not 
within the age group that is protected by the ADEA.208 
Without deciding the propriety of applying the McDonnell Douglas 
evidentiary framework to cases brought under the ADEA, the Supreme Court 
reversed the appellate court’s decision.209  The Court scrutinized the language 
of the ADEA and determined that the ADEA “does not ban discrimination 
against employees because they are aged 40 or older; it bans discrimination 
against employees because of their age, but limits the protected class to those 
who are 40 or older.”210  The Court concluded that “[t]he fact that one person 
in the protected class has lost out to another person in the protected class is 
thus irrelevant, so long as he has lost out because of his age.”211  Justice Scalia, 
writing for the unanimous court, stated: 
[T]he prima facie case requires “evidence adequate to create an inference that 
an employment decision was based on a[n] [illegal] discriminatory 
criterion . . . .”  In the age-discrimination context, such an inference cannot be 
drawn from the replacement of one worker with another worker insignificantly 
younger.  Because the ADEA prohibits discrimination on the basis of age and 
not class membership, the fact that a replacement is substantially younger than 
the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the 
fact that the plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class.212 
There are two possible readings of O’Connor.  The Supreme Court’s 
statement that so long as the aggrieved party “has lost out because of his age,” 
 
 205. 517 U.S. 308, 309 (1996).  See supra note 117 for a discussion of the framework of the 
McDonnell Douglas  prima facie case of discrimination. 
 206. Id. at 309–10. 
 207. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 829 F. Supp. 155, 158, 160 (W.D.N.C. 1993). 
 208. O’Connor v. Consol. Coin Caterers Corp., 56 F.3d 542, 546, 550 (4th Cir. 1995). 
 209. O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 311–13.  Because the parties did not contest the propriety of 
applying the McDonnell Douglas analysis to ADEA cases, the Court proceeded on the 
assumption that such application was appropriate.  Id. at 311. 
 210. Id. at 312. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 312–13 (emphasis in original omitted) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).  The 
Court pointed out that “there can be no greater inference of age discrimination . . . when a 40-
year-old is replaced by a 39-year-old than when a 56-year-old is replaced by a 40-year-old.”  Id. 
at 312. 
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the claim for age discrimination will stand even if both people are in the 
protected class, appears to support the claim for reverse discrimination.  Such 
an interpretation, however, would take the Court’s statements out of context.  
Unlike Cline, O’Connor involved a plaintiff who was older than the defendant.  
The Court’s specific reference to an employee “younger than the plaintiff” 
indicates that the Court contemplated that the plaintiff in the ADEA case must 
be older (or substantially older) in order to establish a prima facie case.213 
On the other hand, it may be argued that the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncements in O’Connor are only marginally relevant to the issue of 
reverse discrimination.  The primary focus of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
O’Connor was whether the replacement worker must be outside the protected 
class, not whether a younger plaintiff may bring a claim under the ADEA.  The 
Court pointed out that a substantial age gap was important in establishing the 
inference of discrimination.214  Nevertheless, when viewed in conjunction with 
the provisions of the ADEA that refer to the rights of “older” individuals, the 
“substantially younger” test established in O’Connor is difficult to reconcile 
with the idea of youth discrimination. 
The Supreme Court’s reliance on the word “individual” is also manifest in 
its interpretation of other anti-discrimination statutes.  For example, in Sutton 
v. United Air Lines, Inc., the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether 
corrective and mitigating measures should be taken into account when 
determining whether an individual is disabled under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”).215  The Court relied on the “individualized 
inquiry” mandated by the ADA provisions that dictate that the disabilities be 
evaluated “with respect to an individual” and in terms of the impact of a 
condition on “such individual.”216  The Court concluded that determination of 
an employee’s disability should be made with reference to the mitigating 
measures he or she employs.217 
Sutton, however, may be distinguished for the most obvious reason that it 
dealt not with the ADEA but with a parallel provision of the ADA.218  Another 
 
 213. Id. at 313 (emphasis added).  See also Stein v. Nat’l City Bank, 942 F.2d 1062, 1064–65 
(6th Cir. 1991) (listing, as the fourth element of the prima facie case, the fact that a person 
younger than the plaintiff was selected for the position over the plaintiff). 
 214. See O’Connor, 517 U.S. at 312.  “[T]he fact that a replacement is substantially younger 
than the plaintiff is a far more reliable indicator of age discrimination than is the fact that the 
plaintiff was replaced by someone outside the protected class.”  Id. at 313. 
 215. 527 U.S. 471, 481 (1999).  See Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2000)). 
 216. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 483 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) and concluding that the 
determination of disability is based on the effects of the impairment on the individual’s life). 
 217. Id. at 482. 
 218. There is no indication in any of the Supreme Court’s ADEA decisions that the Court 
finds it necessary to harmonize the interpretation of the ADEA and the ADA.  The only two 
Supreme Court ADA cases that cited a case arising under the ADEA are EEOC v. Waffle House, 
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factor that reduces the impact of the Court’s analysis in Sutton on the approach 
to the interpretation of the ADEA is that the Sutton Court’s reliance on the 
“individualized inquiry” was just one of the factors that the Court considered 
in reaching its conclusion.  By contrasting the congressional finding that 43 
million Americans are disabled with the studies showing that approximately 
160 million people in the United States suffer from serious impairments, the 
Court determined that Congress did not intend to bring all those whose 
uncorrected conditions amount to disabilities within the protection of the 
ADA.219  In fact, the Court stated that the inquiry into congressional findings 
was critical to its decision.220  The importance of congressional findings was 
informed by the fact that they were included in the text of the ADA and 
therefore give content to the term “disability.”221  While purporting to rely on 
the plain meaning of the ADA, the Court also considered “the letter and the 
spirit of the ADA,”222 reflected on whether the opposite approach would create 
an anomalous result,223 and examined congressional findings that had been 
enacted as part of the ADA.224 
Thus, it appears that the exclusive focus of the Cline court on the effects of 
discrimination on an individual is misplaced.  A broader analysis comparing 
the central prohibition of the ADEA with the entire statutory scheme, which 
had been the unanimous view of the courts prior to Cline, is a more logical 
approach. 
 
Inc., and Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring.  In both cases, the ADEA reference appeared in dicta.  
See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 299–300 n.1 (2002) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(citing Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991), which was brought 
under the ADEA, in support of the proposition that claims brought under the ADA may be subject 
to compulsory arbitration); Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 617 n.1 (1999) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Title VII cases should be consulted for definitions of 
“discrimination” and referring to the Court’s reliance on Title VII cases in the ADEA case of 
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985)). 
 219. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484–87.  The congressional finding that 43 million people are 
disabled is based on the functional understanding of disability.  Id. at 485–86.  By contrast, 
studies based on nonfunctional approaches to disability estimate the number of the disabled to 
include more than 160 million people.  Id. at 485.  Therefore, the congressional finding of the 
substantially lower number of 43 million people “reflects an understanding that those whose 
impairments are largely corrected by medication or other devices are not ‘disabled’ within the 
meaning of the ADA.”  Id. at 486. 
 220. Id. at 484. 
 221. Id. at 487. 
 222. Id. at 484. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 484–89. 
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C. The Language of the ADEA: 29 U.S.C. § 621 
While § 623 and § 631 of the ADEA prohibit age discrimination against 
any individual, the ADEA’s purpose section manifests concern with the “older 
worker.”225  The court in Cline purported to have easily reconciled the relevant 
provisions of the ADEA by summarily concluding that “[i]n § 621, Congress 
declared its intention to protect older workers, and in § 623 and § 631, it 
identified the older workers it intends to protect as ‘any individual’ age 40 or 
older.”226  The rigid reliance on this language of the ADEA, which proscribes 
discrimination “because of . . . age,”227 appears to render superfluous the 
references to “older workers” in the purpose section of the statute.228  As such, 
it runs afoul of the necessity to “interpret statutes as a whole, giving effect to 
each word and making every effort not to interpret a provision in a manner that 
renders other provisions of the same statute inconsistent, meaningless or 
superfluous.”229 
Admittedly, the term “older employee” is itself open to interpretation.  One 
plausible reading of the reference to “older employee” is that it sets apart the 
protected category—employees older than forty—from employees outside a 
protected class.  Another reading zeroes in on the comparative form of the 
adjective “old,”230 which suggests that the plaintiff in an ADEA case must be 
older than the competitor employee who was treated more favorably.  While 
the text of the ADEA does not conclusively answer which definition Congress 
had in mind, the legislative history discussed in Part IV.F of this Note tends to 
support the latter interpretation.  Indeed, the concurring judge in Cline 
admitted that it might be reasonable to read “older” as a comparative 
category.231  Moreover, the Supreme Court’s use of the term “older” in 
O’Connor demonstrates that the ADEA only protects older employees as 
related to those who are chronologically younger.232 
While the Cline majority criticized the Hamilton court for relying too 
much on the congressional statement of purpose, calling the language in § 621 
 
 225. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(1), (a)(3) (2000). 
 226. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. granted, 
123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003). 
 227. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1), (a)(2) (2000). 
 228. Id. § 621(a)(1), (a)(3). 
 229. Cline, 296 F.3d at 471 (internal quotations omitted) (citations omitted); see also FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (requiring courts to interpret a 
statute “‘as a symmetrical and coherent regulatory scheme,’ and ‘fit, if possible, all parts into an 
harmonious whole’”) (citations omitted)). 
 230. See THE OXFORD REFERENCE DICTIONARY 176 (1989) (defining “comparative degree” 
as “the form expressing a higher degree of quality”). 
 231. Cline, 296 F.3d at 472–73 (Cole, J., concurring). 
 232. See supra text accompanying notes 190–199. 
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“hortatory,”233 the importance of congressional findings should not be 
underestimated.234  Congress saw it fit to include the findings in the ADEA 
provisions.  In addition, two other sections of the ADEA specifically reference 
the purposes of the statute in their text.235  The prohibitions of the ADEA 
cannot be understood apart from the congressional statement of findings and 
purpose that provides: 
  (1) in the face of rising productivity and affluence, older workers find 
themselves disadvantaged in their efforts to retain employment, and especially 
to regain employment when displaced from jobs; 
  (2) the setting of arbitrary age limits regardless of potential for job 
performance has become a common practice, and certain otherwise desirable 
practices may work to the disadvantage of older persons; 
  (3) the incidence of unemployment, especially long-term unemployment 
with resultant deterioration of skill, morale, and employer acceptability is, 
relative to the younger ages, high among older workers; their numbers are 
great and growing; and their employment problems grave; 
  (4) the existence in industries affecting commerce, of arbitrary 
discrimination in employment because of age, burdens commerce and the free 
flow of goods in commerce.236 
The multiple references to “older” persons in the statement of finding and 
purpose recognize that discrimination occurs with greater frequency and causes 
greater harm to older employees.237  The statement also underscores that the 
main thrust of congressional concern was arbitrary age discrimination.238  
Arbitrary age discrimination significantly differs from employment decisions 
made on the basis of age.  “Decisions made on the basis of age means [sic] that 
the employer considers the age of an employee . . . when it makes employment 
decisions because the characteristic of age is actually relevant to the choice 
being made, and thus needs to be taken into account by the decision maker.”239  
 
 233. Cline, 296 F.3d at 470. 
 234. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999).  See also supra text 
accompanying notes 205–208. 
 235. 29 U.S.C. § 623(j)(2) (2000) (stating that it is not unlawful for a government employer to 
refuse to hire or discharge any individual “pursuant to a bona fide hiring or retirement plan that is 
not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter”); id. § 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) (stating that it shall 
not be unlawful for an employer “to observe the terms of a . . . voluntary early retirement 
incentive plan [that is] consistent with the relevant purpose or purposes of this chapter”). 
 236. Id. § 621(a) (emphasis added). 
 237. Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why Disparate Impact 
Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 N.C. L. REV. 267, 272 
(1995). 
 238. See Blumrosen, supra note 41, at 74–83. 
 239. Pontz, supra note 237, at 273 n.36. 
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In contrast, arbitrary age discrimination entails consideration of age, despite 
the fact that age bears no relation to the choice being made and should not 
factor into the decision-making.240 
Examples of permissible age considerations abound not only in the ADEA, 
but in other federal legislation as well.  A person’s age, at any level, will either 
grant the right to or prohibit access to societal benefits.241  Age prohibits young 
people from voting, working, drinking alcohol, and driving, and it initiates the 
right or obligation to serve in the armed services.242  Age also serves as a 
restriction on an individual’s ability to serve as America’s elected presidents, 
senators, and representatives.243  Some classes of benefits, such as Social 
Security, are primarily available to people of advanced age.244  In addition to 
Social Security, there are more than a hundred federal, state, and local 
programs that exclusively benefit senior citizens.245 
In the context of employment, the most obvious examples of federal 
legislation that provide enhanced benefits to older individuals are certain 
provisions of ERISA and the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”).246  These 
benefits become available upon attainment of a minimum age and thus facially 
differentiate between employees in the category protected by the ADEA.  For 
example, only employees that are fifty-five and older are allowed a diversified 
account under the Employee Stock Ownership Plan.247  Once an employee 
reaches the age of fifty-nine and a half, the I.R.C. allows a ten percent tax 
waiver on early distributions from qualified retirement plans.248  Age sixty-five 
 
 240. Id. 
 241. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352. 
 242. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI, §1 (right to vote accrues at age 18); 29 U.S.C. § 
203(l)(1) (2000) (child labor is restricted to ages sixteen and older); 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2000) 
(federal highway funds are withheld from states that allow persons younger than twenty-one years 
of age to purchase alcohol); 10 U.S.C. § 519 (2000) (individuals who are at least eighteen years 
of age may be temporarily enlisted in the military during war time)); see also, e.g., MO. REV. 
STAT. § 302.178.1 (Supp. 2002) (intermediate driver’s license available to persons older sixteen). 
 243. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2 (limiting the age of representatives to twenty-five years or 
older); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 3 (limiting the age of Senators to thirty years or older); U.S. 
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 4 (limiting the age of the President to thirty-five years or older). 
 244. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352.  See 42 U.S.C. § 416(l) (2000) (determining Social 
Security eligibility by reference to a “normal retirement age” of sixty-five). 
 245. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352.  See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1002(24) (2000) (employee 
retirement income security); 45 U.S.C. § 231a(a)(1)(i) (2000) (annuity eligibility requirements). 
 246. Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 
*4–*13, Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., v. Cline, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003) (No. 02-1080), 
available at 2003 WL 21649495.  See 26 U.S.C. § 401(a) (2000); id. § 72(t)(2). 
 247. 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(28)(B)(iii) (2000).  See Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, supra note 246, at *5 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 
401(a)(28)(B)(iii) (2000)). 
 248. See Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 246, at *5 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 72(t)(2)(A)(i) (2000)). 
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serves as a milestone that enables an individual to receive retirement benefits 
immediately upon termination of employment, provided that the employee 
began participating in the plan at least ten years earlier.249 
All of these statutes are premised on the implicit acceptance of the validity 
of generalizations about old age and the fact that “age distinctions are not 
always arbitrary because the needs of individuals may vary according to their 
age.”250  When viewed in conjunction with congressional recognition of 
permissible age distinctions reflected in other federal legislation, the statement 
of findings and purpose contained in § 621 of the ADEA supports the view 
that, in enacting the ADEA, Congress sought to address the issues faced by 
American workers as they grow older.  The purposes of the ADEA are not 
compromised when older workers within the protected group are given 
preferential treatment.  Therefore, the purpose section of the ADEA appears 
consistent with precluding a cause of action for reverse age discrimination. 
D. Significance of the Protected Class Under the ADEA 
The Cline court paid little attention to the fact that the ADEA uses an 
arbitrary minimum age threshold to trigger its protections.  This minimum age 
criterion is a powerful reminder that the ADEA itself discriminates on the basis 
of age.  The Committee on Education and Labor chose forty as the lower age 
limit because of testimony that “indicated this to be the age at which age 
discrimination in employment becomes evident.”251 The Committee 
determined that “a further lowering of the age limit proscribed by the bill 
would lessen the primary objective; that is, the promotion of employment 
opportunities for older workers.”252 
By originally defining the protected class as employees between the ages 
of forty and sixty-five, Congress was “obviously unwilling to prohibit all age-
based restrictions in employment.”253  The affirmative grant of the right to be 
free from age discrimination solely to people forty and older appears to be a 
feature that is truly unique to the ADEA.  Remarkably, when Congress passed 
 
 249. See id. at *5 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 401(a)(14) (2000); 29 U.S.C. § 1056(a) (2000)). 
 250. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352.  See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 7 (1967), 
reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 80 (1981) (noting that “[t]oo many 
different types of situations in employment occur for the strict application of general prohibitions 
and provisions”). 
 251. H.R. REP. NO. 90-805, at 6 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 
79 (altering the lower age limit from forty-five in the original bill to forty). 
 252. Id. 
 253. McMorrow, supra note 39, at 352.  For example, by originally limiting the protected 
class, Congress knowingly allowed discriminatory practices such as mandatory retirement of 
stewardesses at age thirty-two.  Id. at 352–53. 
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the Age Discrimination Act in 1975, it provided no minimum age threshold.254  
“By not setting a minimum age for protection under the [Age Discrimination 
Act], Congress suggested that the young are often subject to discrimination 
and, therefore, warrant protection as well.”255  Within the framework of the 
Age Discrimination Act, which prohibits discrimination in federal 
employment, Congress was concerned with younger workers as well as older 
ones.256  By contrast, exclusion of the young from the purview of the ADEA 
suggests that Congress implicitly rejected the idea that relatively younger 
workers need protection under the ADEA. 
E. The ADEA Exceptions 
The impropriety of allowing a cause of action for reverse age 
discrimination becomes even clearer when the ADEA exceptions are 
considered.  Unlike Title VII, which prohibits employment decisions in which 
race plays any role257 and allows very limited exceptions for other categories 
based only on bona fide occupational qualifications (BFOQs),258 the ADEA is 
subject “to an unprecedented number of exceptions.”259  The ADEA recognizes 
a BFOQ exception,260 a general exception for “reasonable factors other than 
age,”261 exceptions for executives,262 and exceptions for certain aspects of 
fringe benefits and retirement plans.263  The “statutory defenses are consistent 
 
 254. The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-135, 78 Stat. 728 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6101–07 (2000)).  The Age Discrimination Act protects individuals 
from age discrimination not only in employment, but in programs and activities receiving federal 
assistance.  See 42 U.S.C. § 6101–02 (2000). 
 255. Fuhrman, supra note 15, at 599. 
 256. See id. at 599 n.114 (citing 121 CONG. REC. 9212 (1975) (statement of Rep. Brademas 
stating that the Act’s “provisions are broad and it is the intent of the committee that it apply to 
age discrimination at all age levels, from the youngest to the oldest”)); Woodruff, supra note 20, 
at 1304 (stating that in passing the Age Discrimination Act, Congress was aware that employees 
younger than forty can also be subjected to age discrimination). 
 257. This statement is limited to the extent that courts have interpreted Title VII to tolerate 
affirmative action.  See United Steelworkers of Am., AFL–CIO–CLC v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 
208 (1979) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit “all private, voluntary, race-conscious 
affirmative action plans”). 
 258. Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(e)(1), Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(1) (2000)).  See also Civil Rights Act of 1964, §§ 702, 703(e)(2), 
Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 252 (codified as amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-1(a), 
2000e-2(e)(2)(2000)) (setting out exceptions to prohibitions against religious discrimination). 
 259. George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment 
Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 495 (1995). 
 260. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000). 
 261. Id. 
 262. Id. § 631(c) (permitting under certain conditions compulsory retirement after age 65 of 
“bona fide executive[s]” or persons who occupy a “high policymaking position”). 
 263. Id. § 623(f)(2). 
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with the ADEA’s [objective] of prohibiting only arbitrary age discrimination in 
employment.”264 
It is uncontested that the ADEA “does not require older workers to be 
treated more favorably than younger ones.”265  However, among the ADEA 
exceptions, one is a particularly telling example of Congress’s willingness to 
allow employers to treat older workers within the protected category more 
favorably than the younger ones.266  Rather than eliminating age classifications 
in the abstract, Congress expressed its special concern for older workers in § 
623(f)(2) of the ADEA by permitting bona fide seniority systems and bona fide 
employee benefit plans.267 
While the OWBPA, which amended the ADEA in 1990, posits that an 
involuntary retirement plan constitutes a violation of the ADEA, it permits 
ERIPs that are voluntary and consistent with the ADEA’s relevant purpose to 
prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment.268  The OWBPA also 
sanctions certain typical features of early retirement plans by specifically 
describing them as consistent with the purposes of the ADEA.  These features 
include: (1) requiring a minimum age as a condition of eligibility for 
participation; (2) providing subsidized early retirement benefits, and (3) 
providing supplements to Social Security benefits.269  
It stands to reason that insofar as seniority systems and ERIPs favor older 
employees over younger ones, “Congress in the Act has expressed at least tacit 
approval” of employers that “favor the aged over the young.”270  As 
Issacharoff and Harris eloquently stated when assessing ERIP provisions, 
“[w]hen it came to benefiting older workers . . . delineations based on age and 
violations of the equal treatment principle proved to be more than just 
acceptable—they were required.”271  The need for older cohorts within the 
protected class to have additional protection or preferential treatment is a 
 
 264. Pontz, supra note 237, at 276. 
 265. See Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog that Didn’t Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1123 n.113 
(1993). 
 266. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (2000). 
 267. See Neil H. Abramson, Early Retirement Incentives Under the ADEA, 11 INDUS. REL. 
L.J. 323, 351 n.157 (1989). 
 268. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A), (B)(ii) (2000).  See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text 
for a general overview of the OWBPA.  The OWBPA permits age distinctions in employee 
benefit plans only if the benefits paid or the costs incurred on behalf of an older worker are at 
least equal to those of a younger worker.  Id. § 623(f)(2)(B)(i). 
 269. Pub. L. No. 101-433, Title I, § 103, 104 Stat. 978 (1990); 29 U.S.C. 623(f)(2)(B)(ii) 
(2000). 
 270. See Abramson, supra note 267, at 351 n.157. 
 271. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 77, at 816. 
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contested issue.272  Regardless of one’s opinion on whether this need is truly 
justified, the congressional intent as exemplified by the seniority and benefit 
exceptions cannot be ignored.  Recognizing a cause of action for reverse 
discrimination under the ADEA will lead to the glaring inconsistency of 
allowing preferential treatment of older cohorts within the protected category 
in one context, yet disavowing benefits that may accrue to older workers in 
other contexts. 
F. Legislative History 
One must wonder whether those who supported the passage of the ADEA 
truly contemplated that younger workers would be able to claim the protection 
of the statute because they were treated less favorably than older workers.  
Careful examination of the congressional record reveals few comments that 
considered the possibility of reverse discrimination.  Senator Dominick stated 
that “under at least one interpretation of this bill[,] it would be legal to 
discriminate on the ground of age as between any two people” in the category 
of workers between forty to sixty-five.273  Senator Dominick specifically 
questioned whether the creation of the protected category of people over forty 
would open the employer up to a charge by a younger worker within the 
protected class if the employer gives preferential treatment to an older 
employee.274 
The only response to Senator Dominick’s concern came in the comment by 
Senator Yarborough who stated that it was not the intent of the law to “permit 
discrimination in employment on account of age, whether discrimination might 
be attempted between a man 38 and one 52 years of age, or between one 42 
and one 52 years of ago [sic].”275  The conflicting comments of Senators 
Dominick and Yarborough may be indicative of the competing congressional 
purpose.  Conversely, the lack of response from other members of Congress to 
the possibility of intragroup discrimination may simply reveal that the 
 
 272. See id. at 783, 795, 816 (stating that the ADEA became a wealth-grabbing mechanism 
for older white male employees).  Issacharoff & Harris argue that “[t]his profile of both the 
typical ADEA plaintiff and the subject of litigation suggests that the ADEA has developed into a 
wrongful termination cause of action . . . rather than the protection against categorical action 
based on the sort of invidious motivation generally associated with the term ‘discrimination’ and 
originally envisioned by Congress.”  Id. at 796. 
 273. S. REP. NO. 723, at 15 (1967) (individual views of Sen. Dominick), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 119–20. 
 274. Id. at 15–16.  Senator Dominick noted that “one committee counsel has stated that if 
both parties are within the protected age, neither can sue, while another counsel interprets the bill 
to mean just the opposite.”  Id. at 16. 
 275. 113 CONG. REC. 31,255 (1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 
146. 
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supporters of the bill did not see the problem of reverse age discrimination as 
an issue. 
In fact, the entire congressional debate was based on reports that detailed 
age discrimination in the classic sense—in favor of younger workers.  In 
enacting the ADEA, Congress “clearly was concerned with the plight of the 
older worker and the fact that discrimination seemed to intensify as employees 
progressed in age.”276  The frequent references to “senior citizens” by the bill’s 
sponsors can hardly be translated to mean people in their early forties.277 
In addition, the legislative history of the ADEA is replete with evidence 
that Congress was not concerned with the “hazards of age classifications per 
se,” but rather with the inaccurate stereotypes and misconceptions about the 
abilities of older workers.278  Congress’s concern with arbitrary age 
discrimination is illustrated by President Johnson’s message to Congress 
recommending enactment of the ADEA in which he characterized the ADEA 
as “a law prohibiting arbitrary and unjust discrimination in employment 
because of a person’s age.”279  The legislative history suggests that Congress 
did not seek to eliminate “all age classifications from the workplace, regardless 
of which age cohort benefited from those classifications.”280  In the words of 
Senator Yarborough, the ADEA is “not directed to all instances of 
differentiation on the basis of age.”281 
The Wirtz Report that argued for passage of the federal age discrimination 
statute did not focus on animus-based discrimination against older workers.282  
Researchers have also found that “‘the kind of ‘we–they’ thinking that foster[s] 
racial, ethnic, and sexual discrimination is unlikely to play a role in the 
treatment of the elderly worker . . . because the people who make the firing and 
hiring decisions are often older individuals.”283  Therefore, to presume the 
existence of such animus within the protected group seems unreasonable.  
Consequently, providing greater benefits to older employees does not entail 
 
 276. Abramson, supra note 267, at 351. 
 277. E.g., 113 CONG. REC. 2467 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough), reprinted in 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 66. 
 278. Abramson, supra note 267, at 351. 
 279. Lyndon B. Johnson, AID FOR THE AGED: A MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT, H.R. Doc. 
No. 40, 90th Cong. (Jan. 23, 1967), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 60, 61. 
 280. Abramson, supra note 267, at 351. 
 281. 113 CONG. REC. 2467 (1967) (statement of Sen. Yarborough), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE 
HISTORY, supra note 42, at 66. 
 282. See supra notes 41–52 and accompanying text.  See also DAVID NEUMARK, AGE 
DISCRIMINATION LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED STATES 18 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 8152, 2001) (citing THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER, supra note 42), 
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w8152.  By contrast, race discrimination has a “well-
documented history of animus,” which sets it apart from age discrimination.  See id. 
 283. See Neumark, supra note 282, at 18 (quoting RICHARD POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 
320 (1995)). 
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stigmatization of younger workers within the protected group, which is 
commonly associated with race or sex discrimination.  Allowing a cause of 
action for reverse discrimination would replace the congressional “concern for 
the vulnerability of older workers at the end of the life-cycle . . . by an 
inflexibly reactive approach which [makes] any age classification 
presumptively invalid.”284 
G. The EEOC Interpretation 
The majority in Cline placed great reliance on the EEOC’s interpretation of 
intragroup discrimination under the ADEA. “[T]he EEOC has statutory 
authority to investigate claims and bring actions independent” of the ability of 
individual employees to bring claims.285  The EEOC has interpreted the ADEA 
in 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a), which states: 
It is unlawful . . . for an employer to discriminate in hiring or in any other way 
by giving preference because of age between individuals 40 or over. Thus, if 
two people apply for the same position, and one . . . is 42 and the other 52, the 
employer may not lawfully turn down either one on the basis of age, but must 
base such decision on the basis of some other factor.286 
The EEOC Policy Guidance further elaborates on the issue and posits that 
“discrimination on the basis of age is generally unlawful even between 
individuals who are within the Protected Age Group.”287  In addition, in 
section 1625.2(b) of its guidelines the EEOC provides that “additional benefits, 
such as increased severance pay, to older employees within the protected group 
may be lawful if an employer has a reasonable basis to conclude that those 
benefits will counteract problems related to age discrimination.”288 
The positions expressed by the EEOC in sections 1625.2(a) and (b) of its 
guidelines appear to be somewhat inconsistent.  While subsection (a) makes 
 
 284. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 77, at 831. 
 285. EEOC v. Am. & Efird Mills, Inc., 964 F.2d 300, 301 (4th Cir. 1992).  Originally, 
Congress gave responsibility for enforcing the ADEA to the Department of Labor.  Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-902, §§ 6-7, 81 Stat. 602, 604-605 
(1967).  In 1979, Congress transferred these responsibilities to the EEOC.  Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 
1978, 3 C.F.R. 321 (1978), reprinted in 92 Stat. 3781, 3781 (1978). 
 286. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a) (2002). 
 287. EEOC: CASES INVOLVING THE EXTENSION OF ADDITIONAL BENEFITS TO OLDER 
WORKERS, POLICY GUIDANCE 2 (1988), reprinted in EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
PROGRAM, AGE DISCRIMINATION, § V(F) (1998).  Notably, the Department of Labor, which was 
in charge of enforcing the ADEA before the EEOC, issued several opinion letters that allowed for 
preferential treatment of older workers within the protected group.  See Barry Bennett Kaufman, 
Preferential Hiring Policies for Older Workers Under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 825, 834 (1983).  One of those letters approved the exclusion of workers 
older than fifty from “‘comparatively undesirable work assignments’ such as compulsory 
overtime.”  Id. (quoting WH-419, EMPL. PRAC. GUIDE (CCH) ¶ 5036 (July 1977)). 
 288. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(b). 
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age an entirely impermissible characteristic to consider in employment 
decisions, implicit in subsection (b) is the recognition by the EEOC of the 
increased needs of older people within the protected group and the likelihood 
that older individuals experience age discrimination to a greater extent than 
younger ones.  There are no reported cases where the courts have turned to 
subsection (b) of the EEOC regulations, possibly because the claims of reverse 
age discrimination have been exceedingly rare.  The court in Cline also ignored 
subsection (b) of the guidelines although the benefits at issue in Cline seem to 
fit under the category of “additional benefits” contemplated by the EEOC in 
section 1625(b) of the regulations.289 
In order to determine whether Cline’s reliance on section 1625.2(a) of the 
EEOC guidelines was justified, it is important to examine the role of the EEOC 
guidelines in interpreting the civil rights statutes.  Despite the fact that the 
courts often consider the EEOC guidelines and afford deference to the EEOC 
in their decisions,290 the EEOC’s interpretations are not entitled to Chevron 
deference.291  As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Mead Corp., 
“‘interpretations contained in policy statements, agency manuals, and 
enforcement guidelines’” do not fall within the Chevron framework.292  This 
explanation means that the EEOC interpretations are not binding and are only 
accorded deference when they support the views of the courts on a substantive 
issue.293 
 
 289. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 471 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted, 123 S. Ct. 1786 (2003) (citing to 29 C.F.R. § 1625.2(a), but not §1625.2(b)).  The Cline 
court may have been unwilling to raise the § 1625.2(b) exceptions if the parties did not assert 
them. 
 290. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (administrative interpretation of 
the Act by the enforcing agency, “while not controlling upon the courts by reason of their 
authority, do constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants 
may properly resort for guidance”).  See also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141–42 
(1976) (courts may refer to the EEOC interpretations for guidance but need not follow them); 
Cline, 296 F.3d at 471 (6th Cir. 2002).  “The EEOC’s interpretation of the ADEA ‘is significant 
because an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous provision within the statute it is authorized to 
implement is entitled to judicial deference.’”  Cline, 296 F.3d at 471 (quoting Burzynski v. 
Cohen, 264 F.3d 611, 619 (6th Cir. 2001)). 
 291. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 
(1984) (stating that the court should not impose its own construction of the statute if it determines 
that the agency’s interpretation of the statute is based on a permissible construction). 
 292. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 223 n.17 (2001) (quoting Christensen v. 
Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000)). 
 293. See generally John S. Moot, Comment, An Analysis of Judicial Deference to EEOC 
Interpretive Guidelines, 1 ADMIN. L.J. 213 (1987).  For example, the Supreme Court, in Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., determined that the EEOC regulations defining “physical impairment” 
without reference to corrective measures were an impermissible interpretation of the ADA.  527 
U.S. 471, 479–82 (1999).  The Court found that the guidelines’ approach was “contrary to both 
the letter and the spirit of the ADA.”  Id. at 484. 
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It is apparent that the Cline court’s reliance on the EEOC’s interpretation 
of the ADEA is tenuous at best. The selective use of only section 1625.2(a) of 
the EEOC guidelines and the inherent tension between the two subsections of 
the EEOC guidelines raise concerns about the reliance of the Cline court on the 
position expressed by the EEOC.  The Hamilton court’s rejection of the EEOC 
guidance on the issue of reverse discrimination seems to be a more sound 
approach.294 
H. State Law 
The concurring opinion in Cline relied on the growing trend among state 
courts to recognize a cause of action for reverse age discrimination based on 
the states’ anti-discrimination laws.295  The ADEA does not preempt state laws 
that provide additional protection against age discrimination in employment.296  
Section 633(a) states that the ADEA will not affect the jurisdiction of the state 
agencies performing similar functions, and § 633(b) gives state proceedings 
certain priorities over federal actions relating to age discrimination.297  The 
language of the ADEA providing that the commencement of a federal action 
shall supersede state claims only means that the state proceedings will be 
stayed, but not dismissed.298  Several courts have explicitly recognized that 
state age discrimination laws do not need to conform to the ADEA.299  In fact, 
some courts have held that the ADEA “anticipates and encourages state 
regulation.”300 
States vary considerably in the age range at which they provide 
protection.301  The New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (“LAD”) is a 
typical example of a state law that contains a broad prohibition against age 
discrimination in employment by stating that it is unlawful for an employer 
 
 294. See Hamilton v. Caterpillar, Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227–28 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 295. Cline, 296 F.3d at 474–75 (Cole, J., concurring). 
 296. 29 U.S.C. § 633(a) (2000); see also Hulme v. Barrett, 449 N.W.2d 629, 631 (Iowa 1989) 
(stating that “[t]he federal Act does not preempt state age discrimination laws”). 
 297. 29 U.S.C. §§ 633(a)–(b) (2000). 
 298. Dunlop v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 672 F.2d 1044, 1049 n.7 (2d Cir. 1982). 
 299. E.g., Johnson v. Labor & Indus. Review Comm’n, 547 N.W.2d 783, 787 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1996) (stating that “state age discrimination laws do not need to conform to federal law”); 
Kunzman v. Enron Corp., 902 F. Supp. 882, 902 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (stating that the ADEA “does 
not preempt state age discrimination laws, so that the state court looks to its own act to determine 
if plaintiff is a protected person”); Fink v. Kitzman, 881 F. Supp. 1347, 1366 (N.D. Iowa 1995). 
 300. E.g., Hillman v. Consumers Power Co., 282 N.W.2d 422, 424 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
 301. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6(3) (West 2000) (age eighteen or older); N.Y. EXEC. 
LAW § 296(3-a)(a) (Consol. 1975) (age eighteen or older); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.33(1) (West 
2002) (age forty or older).  Numerous states do not limit age discrimination protection to any 
particular age.  E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-60(a)(1) (West 1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 
760.10(1)(a) (West 1997); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (West 2002); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 354-A:7 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 143-422.2 (2001). 
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“because of the . . . age . . . of any individual . . . to refuse to hire or employ or 
to bar or to discharge or require to retire . . . or to discriminate against such 
individual in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of 
employment.302  The LAD also provides that “[a]ll persons shall have the 
opportunity to obtain employment . . . without discrimination because of . . . 
age. . . . This opportunity is recognized as and declared to be a civil right.”303  
The LAD does not contain a minimum age requirement, but does provide an 
exception to age discrimination by allowing employers to refuse to hire a 
person younger than eighteen years of age or hire or promote a person older 
than seventy years of age.304 
The New Jersey Supreme Court addressed the issue of reverse 
discrimination under the LAD in Bergen Commercial Bank v. Sisler.305  In 
Sisler, the court held that a twenty-five-year-old employee stated a legally 
sufficient claim when he alleged that he had been terminated because he was 
too young to occupy the position of bank vice-president and had been replaced 
with a thirty-one-year-old employee.306  Having noted that, unlike the ADEA, 
the LAD does not limit the class of plaintiffs to those older than forty,307 the 
court found that “the LAD’s prohibition against age discrimination is broad 
enough to accommodate [a] claim of age discrimination based on youth.”308  In 
an attempt to divine legislative intent behind the LAD, the court conducted an 
exhaustive search of sources, including the text of the statute, legislative 
history, legal commentary, and prior precedent.309  The court emphasized that, 
consistent with the underlying purpose of the state anti-discrimination laws, the 
LAD was to be construed liberally.310  The court determined that the intent of 
New Jersey legislation was to “‘discourage the use of categories in 
employment decisions which ignore the individual characteristics of particular 
applicants.’”311  The court did observe, however, that the job market generally 
favors younger workers, and concluded that a plaintiff alleging reverse age 
discrimination “clearly bears a heavy burden in demonstrating that his 
 
 302. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(a) (West 2002) (also listing “race, creed, color, national 
origin, ancestry, . . . marital status, affectional or sexual orientation, genetic information, sex or 
atypical hereditary cellular or blood trait of any individual” among the protected factors). 
 303. Id. at § 10:5-4 (West 2002). 
 304. Id. at §§ 10:5-2.1, 10:5-12(a) (West 2002). 
 305. 723 A.2d 944 (N.J. 1999). 
 306. Id. at 948, 957. 
 307. Id. at 952.  See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-2.1, 10:5-12(a) (West 2002) (LAD protects 
individuals against age discrimination beginning at age eighteen.). 
 308. Sisler, 723 A.2d at 957. 
 309. Id. at 950–53. 
 310. Id. at 958. 
 311. Id. (quoting Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 682 P.2d 802, 810 (Or. Ct. App. 1984), aff’d, 
698 P.2d 189 (Or. 1985) (en banc)). 
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employer had ‘some reason or inclination’ to discriminate against youthful 
employees.”312 
Similarly, the Michigan Court of Appeals held that the state’s civil rights 
act allowed a cause of action for discrimination on the basis of youth in Zanni 
v. Medaphis Physician Services Corp.313 Unlike the ADEA, Michigan’s 
Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act covers persons eighteen years of age and 
older.314  In Zanni, a thirty-one-year-old account executive claimed that she 
was discriminated against because of her relative youth.315  The plaintiff 
alleged that after her supervisor told her that her voice sounded too young on 
the phone and that a client wanted an older account executive, she was 
replaced by an older, less qualified employee.316  The court expressly relied on 
the plain language of the state statute, which prohibits discrimination based on 
“chronological age,” in recognizing the cause of action.317  The court found 
nothing in the statute that limited its applicability to any particular age 
group.318 
The court noted that its holding was in line with goal of the statute, namely 
“to eliminate the effects of offensive or demeaning stereotypes, prejudices, and 
biases.”319  The court observed that the potential for younger workers to be 
judged on the basis of inaccurate stereotypes exists in spite of their relative 
youth.320  The court found the case law construing the ADEA inapposite for 
the purposes of interpreting the state statute because the ADEA specifically 
limits the protected category to individuals older than forty.321  Several other 
state courts echoed the reasoning of Sisler and Zanni.322 
By contrast, the Massachusetts Supreme Court refused to extend the 
protection of the state anti-discrimination statute to younger employees.323  In 
Rock v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, the employer 
 
 312. Id. at 960.  The court found that Sisler’s allegations that the chairman of the bank was 
shocked to discover his age and advised Sisler not to reveal his age to other bank officers because 
he would be embarrassed if other people found out it was sufficient to establish a prima facie 
showing of an “unusual” tendency to discriminate against a majority plaintiff.  Id. at 959. 
 313. 612 N.W.2d 845, 847 (Mich. Ct. App. 2000). 
 314. MICH. COMP. L. SERV. §§ 37.2101–2804 (Lexis 2001). 
 315. Zanni, 612 N.W.2d at 846. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 847. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Zanni, 612 N.W.2d at 848.  The court noted, “[j]ust as an older worker may be 
inaccurately perceived as less energetic and resistant to new ideas, a younger worker may be 
unfairly viewed as immature and unreliable, without regard for individual merits.” Id. 
 321. Id. at 847. 
 322. See, e.g., Ogden v. Bureau of Labor, 699 P.2d 189, 192 (Or. 1985) (en banc) 
(interpreting the Oregon age discrimination law to allow claims by younger workers). 
 323. Rock v. Mass. Comm’n Against Discrimination, 424 N.E.2d 244, 249 (Mass. 1981). 
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offered additional early retirement benefits to employees who were older than 
fifty-five.324  Employees between the ages of forty and fifty-five brought a suit 
under the Massachusetts anti-discrimination law.325  The court found that 
offering additional retirement benefits to older cohorts within the protected 
class did not constitute unlawful discrimination.326  The court explicitly relied 
on federal case law that interpreted the ADEA and stated that the “concept of a 
‘protected class’ has a narrower application in age discrimination cases than in 
the race or sex discrimination context.”327 
The court recognized that “‘[b]ecause age is a relative rather than absolute 
status when taken as a basis for discrimination, it need not follow that all 
persons protected by the [ADEA] should be grouped together for purposes of 
delineating the extent of their protection.’”328  The court also indicated that 
“the history, language, and spirit” of the state anti-discrimination statute 
mandated that the plaintiff show an injury to an expected employment 
benefit—an injury that was absent in the case of additional early retirement 
benefits.329  Younger employees lost no reasonably expected employee benefit, 
and the legislative history of the act indicated that the statute was only 
concerned with injuries to older workers resulting from a refusal to hire, 
demotion, or discharge based on age.330 
The review of state court decisions illuminates the important distinctions 
between the ADEA and state civil rights statutes.  The distinguishing feature of 
the states’ age discrimination statutes, which gave rise to successful reverse 
age discrimination claims, is the absence of the lower age threshold defining 
the protected class.  The absence of the lower age limit indicates that state 
legislatures were equally concerned with the plight of young as well as older 
workers.  In addition, unlike the ADEA, state statutes do not contain the 
numerous exceptions listed in the ADEA.331  Thus, interpreting state statutes to 
prohibit consideration of age per se is in line with the blanket prohibition of 
state statutes against age discrimination. 
Despite the fact that state courts have been more active in the area of 
reverse age discrimination, only four jurisdictions—New Jersey, Michigan, 
 
 324. Id. at 245. 
 325. Id. (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(1) (2000)). 
 326. Id. at 248. 
 327. Id. at 247–48. 
 328. Rock, 424 N.E.2d at 248 (quoting Moore v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 F. Supp. 357, 
366 (N.D. Ga. 1979)). 
 329. Id. at 246–47. 
 330. Id. 
 331. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 216.6(5) (West 2001) (exception for employees aged 
forty-five and older in bona fide apprenticeship programs); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 111.33(2)(e) 
(West 2002) (exception for hiring to a position in which knowledge and experience is required for 
future advancement to a managerial or executive position). 
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Maine and Oregon—have extended the states’ age discrimination protection to 
younger plaintiffs.332  In addition to representing a minority view, state law 
decisions do not inform interpretation of a federal statute and do not aid in the 
attempt to divine congressional intent.  Because there are no prohibitions 
against states expanding upon the federal anti-discrimination legislation, “state 
law can supplement the protection afforded under the ADEA.”333  The lack of 
preemption “paves the way for influential state legislation . . . which prohibits 
age discrimination without targeting a specific age group.”334  Thus, states are 
free to enact laws that will permit reverse age discrimination lawsuits for 
people in their forties as well as for younger workers.  Considering that the 
ADEA only provides “minimum standards for barring age discrimination in 
employment for workers,”335 such a result would be both fair and desirable. 
V.  TITLE VII AND THE ADEA ANALOGY 
It may seem anomalous, at first glance, to recognize reverse race and sex 
discrimination claims under Title VII and to refuse a cause of action for 
reverse age discrimination under the ADEA.  A number of substantive 
provisions of the ADEA are modeled after Title VII.336  It has also been widely 
accepted that, in addition to some common language, the ADEA and Title VII 
share “a common purpose: ‘the elimination of discrimination in the 
workplace.’”337  Although Title VII and the ADEA share a common origin, the 
two statutes diverge in many aspects, as evidenced by the text of the statutes 
and their legislative histories.338 
 
 332. See Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., 296 F.3d 466, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2002) (Cole, J., 
concurring). 
 333. See Fuhrman, supra note 15, at 600. 
 334. Id. 
 335. THE AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967, 113 Cong. Rec. 2467 
(statement of Sen. Yarborough), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 42, at 66. 
 336. See Roberta Sue Alexander, Comment, The Future of Disparate Impact Analysis For 
Age Discrimination in a Post-Hazen Paper World, 25 U. DAYTON L. REV. 75, 87 (1999). 
 337. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ’g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995) (quoting Oscar 
Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979)). 
 338. There is a marked disagreement among scholars whether differences and similarities 
between Title VII and the ADEA warrant treating the categories protected by the statutes in the 
same manner or require substantial divergence. Compare, e.g., Julie Vigil, Comment, Expanding 
the Hostile Environment Theory to Cover Age Discrimination: How Far is Too Far?, 23 PEPP. L. 
REV. 565, 592 (1996) (finding no support for treating the two statutes differently), with Pontz, 
supra note 237, at 310–314 (taking the position that the disparate impact theory available under 
Title VII should not be extended to claims under the ADEA).  This Note does not attempt to 
resolve the conflicting points of view.  The author’s only contention is that for the purposes of 
recognizing a cause of action for reverse age discrimination, the two statutes cannot and should 
not be equated. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2003] FLOURISHING FORTIES AGAINST FLAMING FIFTIES 267 
The ADEA was enacted as an independent statute, rather than an 
amendment to Title VII.  Apart from the ADEA’s narrower objectives, other 
characteristics distinguish it from Title VII.  “Unlike Title VII, which provides 
equal protection from discrimination for men and women, blacks and whites, 
and so on, the ADEA extends only to individuals over the age of [forty].”339  
Some legal scholars suggest that this distinction may imply that a “protected 
age group” in fact translates into preferential treatment and creates a privileged 
class of citizens.340  Without challenging the propriety of conclusions about the 
“rent-seeking” behavior of senior citizens, it remains a fact that the framers of 
the ADEA sought to protect only older adults. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins indicates that 
the substantive analysis of age discrimination claims under the ADEA should 
be distinct from the principles underlying Title VII claims.341  The central issue 
in Hazen Paper was the relationship between age discrimination and seniority 
systems.342  The Court ruled that there was no cause of action under the ADEA 
“when the factor motivating the employer is some feature other than the 
employee’s age.”343  The Court found that the use of factors that correlated 
with age was acceptable under the ADEA.344 
In Hazen Paper, Justice O’Connor stated that “[i]t is the very essence of 
age discrimination for an older employee to be fired because the employer 
believes that productivity and competence decline with old age.”345  Justice 
O’Connor further noted that in enacting the ADEA, Congress sought to 
eliminate the use of “inaccurate and denigrating generalization[s] about 
 
 339. Clint Bolick, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Equal Opportunity or Reverse 
Discrimination?, CATO INSTITUTE POLICY ANALYSIS No. 82 (1987), available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pa/pa082.html. 
 340. See id. (arguing that the ADEA has been transformed into an artificial advantage for the 
elderly in violation of the principal of equal opportunity and economic liberty); Issacharoff & 
Harris, supra note 77, passim (opining that the ADEA amendments forced the transfer of wealth 
to the least deserving group of society); Rutherglen, supra note 259, at 521 (finding that the 
ADEA has lost its justification because the primary beneficiaries are not a historically 
disadvantaged group). 
 341. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).  See H. Lane Dennard, Jr. & Kendall L. Kelly, Price Waterhouse: 
Alive and Well Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 51 MERCER L. REV. 721, 744 
(2000) (noting that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Hazen Paper and Kimel v. Florida Board Of 
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), set the ADEA apart from Title VII). 
 342. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 608. 
 343. Id. at 609. 
 344. Id. at 611–12. 
 345. Id. at 610.  AARP contends that, “[b]ased on this comment[,] an alarming number of 
federal circuit and district courts have held that [the] ADEA only prohibits discrimination based 
on inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes about older workers.”  AARP, THE POLICY BOOK: 
AARP PUBLIC POLICIES 2002 4–5 (2002), available at http://www.aarp.org/ppa/ch4.pdf.  “Even 
more troubling,” says AARP, is that “the courts are requiring age discrimination victims to 
produce evidence that such stereotypes were operative.”  Id. 
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age,”346 and that “‘age discrimination rarely [is] based on the sort of animus 
motivating some other forms of discrimination.’”347  In addition to reiterating 
the “older employee” standard for application of the ADEA, the Hazen Paper 
Court dismissed the idea that the principles of Title VII application could be 
directly imported into the ADEA.348  In light of the difference in rationale of 
the ADEA and Title VII, the majority opinion refused to rule on whether the 
disparate impact theory of liability should be extended to age.349  The 
concurrence explicitly acknowledged that there were “substantial arguments 
that it is improper to carry over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the 
ADEA.”350 
Some critics view Hazen Paper as narrowing the scope of and eroding the 
application of the ADEA.351  Others applaud the Hazen Paper Court for 
recognizing the differences inherent in discrimination against various protected 
groups and, specifically, in differentiating between “impermissible 
stereotyping” and “valid economic generalizations.”352  Hazen Paper has been 
widely criticized by the proponents of disparate impact analysis under the 
ADEA.353  One of the criticisms centers on the Hazen Paper decision running 
contrary to the doctrine of in pari materia which posits that “the interpretation 
of one statute ‘may be influenced by language of other statutes which are not 
specifically related, but which apply to similar persons, things, or 
relationships.’”354  The very definition of the doctrine of in pari materia belies 
its application in the context of reverse discrimination.355  The similarity of 
persons or relationships is precisely what is missing from ADEA and Title VII. 
 
 346. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610. 
 347. Id. at 612 (quoting EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 231 (1983)). 
 348. See, e.g., Brendan Sweeney, Comment, “Downsizing” the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act: the Availability of Disparate Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1527, 1558 
(1996); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 733 n.20 (3d Cir. 1995) (stating that 
Hazen Paper disposes of the assumption “that interpretations of the ADEA parallel 
interpretations of Title VII”). 
 349. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610. 
 350. Id. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 351. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 336, at 107–08. 
 352. See Michael J. Van Sistine & Bruce Meredith, The Legality of Early Retirement 
Incentive Plans: Can Quantum Physics Help Resolve the Current Uncertainty?, 84 MARQ. L. 
REV. 587, 634 (2001). 
 353. E.g., Alexander, supra note 336, at 88–92 (arguing that statutory language, history, and 
policy considerations support employing the same analytical approach to the two statutes). 
 354. See id. at 88 (quoting Nat’l Fed’n of Fed. Employees v. Dep’t of Interior, 526 U.S. 86 
(1999)). 
 355. In pari materia is translated from Latin as “in the same matter.”  BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 794 (7th ed. 1999).  “It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari 
materia may be construed together, so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by 
looking at another statute on the same subject.”  Id. 
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The idea that the principles of Title VII application cannot be transferable 
in all their particulars to the ADEA is especially relevant in the context of 
reverse discrimination.  The lack of symmetry in the application of 
discrimination principles in the context of age is in line with the Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Hazen Paper. 
A. Immutability 
In addition to the differences in the statutory language and the histories of 
the ADEA and Title VII, the cause of action for reverse discrimination should 
not be recognized under the ADEA because of substantive differences between 
the characteristics that the two statutes seek to protect.  Unlike race, sex, 
national origin and, to some extent, religion, age is not a fixed and immutable 
characteristic.  A trait is immutable when an “individual has little or no control 
over it,”356 and has sometimes been defined as the inability of individuals to 
enter or leave a particular group.357  While an alien can eventually move out of 
his or her group by acquiring citizenship, or a Democrat or Republican may 
change political affiliation, presumably no such choice is available to people of 
a certain race, sex, or national origin.358  Immutability is important in the 
context of discrimination because individuals in groups such as race, sex, and 
national origin who possess immutable characteristics cannot ever leave their 
group, are more vulnerable, and thus require more protection.359 
Unlike race or sex, age represents a continuum and an inevitable guarantee 
that, in the normal course of events, all of us will age.  As such, age is not 
immutable.360  The main feature that sets it apart from race or sex is that at 
some point every member of society will join this presumably disadvantaged 
group.361  If not yet associated with the social group of the elderly, most of the 
younger people have family members in the older cohorts.  Therefore, 
mutability serves as a safeguard from potentially rampant abuse, which is more 
likely to occur against a group with which the abuser has neither immediate 
nor potential affiliation.362 
 
 356. Thomas W. Simon, Suspect Class Democracy: A Social Theory, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
107, 147 (1990). 
 357. See Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 609. 
 358. See Simon, supra note 356, at 147–49. 
 359. See id. at 149; Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 609. 
 360. Some critics have argued that age is immutable in one sense but not in another.  See 
Simon, supra note 356, at 148 (stating that age is immutable because “one can never grow 
younger,” yet not immutable because “no one is fixed at a particular age”). 
 361. See Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 610. 
 362. See id. 
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Thus, age is unique among other characteristics protected by 
antidiscrimination laws because it is not immutable.363  This realization 
requires that age be treated differently from other “prototypical” groups 
protected by the classic age-discrimination theory.364  Numerous distinctions 
between age and race or sex have led some scholars to conclude that “separate 
models must be used to determine the legality of age-based distinctions 
depending upon the context in which the distinctions are made.”365  Van 
Sistine and Meredith argue that in some situations older people are subject to 
the same type of stereotyping and arbitrary discrimination as African-
Americans, while in other situations the different treatment is based on valid 
generalizations about age.366  They cite ERIPs as an example of the latter 
situation because an ERIP is a “valuable benefit” rather than an “adverse 
treatment based on prejudice.”367  ERIPs are premised on “the employer’s 
desire to save money” and to increase older workers’ retirement options.368  
Relying on the text of OWBPA and the ADEA’s congressional history, the 
authors conclude that age distinctions within a voluntary ERIP should not be 
viewed as evidence of discrimination.369 
The logic of Van Sistine and Meredith’s analysis can be extended to other 
benefits made available to older cohorts within the protected class.  Because of 
the differences between the protected categories and the fact that the ADEA is 
a limited legislative remedy, it is best to analyze the phenomenon of reverse 
age discrimination using a more pragmatic and flexible approach.  Recognizing 
that a more favorable treatment of the older workers within the protected class 
does not constitute discrimination in the classic sense, is part and parcel of 
such an approach. 
B. Age versus Race and Sex Discrimination in the Constitutional Context 
The difference in the doctrinal underpinnings of race and sex 
discrimination is underscored by the different treatment afforded to race and 
sex discrimination by the Supreme Court in equal protection cases.370  Despite 
 
 363. Arguably, disability also shares non-immutable characteristics because anyone is 
potentially subject to disability. However, unlike aging, disability does not, in the normal course 
of events, occur to every person, but affects only a percentage of the population. 
 364. Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 598. 
 365. Id. at 596.  The authors further argue that the “classical discrimination theory simply 
does not provide one overarching principle by which all age distinctions can be judged” and 
suggest that ERIPs should not trigger classical discrimination scrutiny.  Id. at 596, 655. 
 366. Id. at 614. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id. 
 369. Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 642–43, 655. 
 370. See Christine Godsil Cooper, Where Are We Going With Gilmer?—Some Ruminations 
on the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, 11 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 203, 224 (1992) 
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the fact that the constitutional body of law is distinct and separate from case 
law under anti-discriminatory statutes, it is a well-suited source for reviewing 
the difference in treatment of age and other categories.  What makes the 
Supreme Court’s equal protection decisions particularly relevant is that they 
“represent the most developed body of theory” providing conceptual 
justifications for why specific groups require protection.371 
While race is considered a suspect classification and requires strict scrutiny 
by the courts,372 gender is termed a “semi-suspect” classification with attendant 
intermediate scrutiny,373 and age enjoys no suspect classification and 
commands only rational-basis review.374  A classic example is the Supreme 
Court’s comparison of race and age in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. 
Murgia.375  In Murgia, the Court sustained the rationality standard in 
evaluating mandatory retirement law for state police officers.376 
The Murgia Court advanced several arguments in support of its different 
treatment of age as opposed to race or national origin.  First, the older workers 
have not experienced a “‘history of purposeful unequal treatment’” by the 
government.377  Second, the older workers have not experienced bias because 
of “stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities.”378  Third, 
the Court did not see the aged as a “‘discrete and insular group’ in need of 
‘extraordinary protection.’”379  Finally, the Court acknowledged that, unlike an 
immutable characteristic such as race, age does ultimately affect a person’s 
 
(acknowledging that in the constitutional context, the courts consider age discrimination to be 
“less loathsome than race discrimination”). 
 371. Van Sistine & Meredith, supra note 352, at 600-01; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 
429 U.S. 125, 133 (1976) (noting that “in the case of defining the term ‘discrimination,’ which 
Congress has nowhere in Title VII defined, those cases afford an existing body of law analyzing 
and discussing that term in a legal context not wholly dissimilar to the concerns which Congress 
manifested in enacting Title VII”). 
 372. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 904 (1995) (racial and ethnical distinctions are 
inherently suspect); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (noting that 
laws classifying citizens on the basis of race cannot be upheld under strict scrutiny unless 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest). 
 373. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).  The court stated that 
the party seeking to defend gender classifications must demonstrate “that the classification serves 
‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed’ are 
‘substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’”  Id. (quotations omitted). 
 374. See Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (reasoning that “[o]ld age . . . 
does not define a discrete and insular minority because all persons, if they live out their normal 
life spans, will experience it”). 
 375. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam). 
 376. Id. at 312. 
 377. Id. at 313 (quoting San Antonio Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973)). 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. (quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938)). 
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ability to work.380  Applying rational basis scrutiny, the Court had no trouble 
concluding that mandatory retirement at fifty was constitutional because it 
removed from police service those whose fitness “presumptively . . . 
diminished with age.”381  Other decisions have echoed the Court’s reasoning in 
Murgia.382 
In summary, the Supreme Court has recognized the fundamental 
differences between age and other protected categories and ultimately has 
refused to treat age classifications as suspect.  The Supreme Court’s approach 
to age classifications thus supports the conclusion that the ADEA protection 
does not need to be harmonized with Title VII and may run “one way.” 
VI.  SOCIAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
In his concurring opinion in Cline, Judge Cole cited Congress’s finding 
that “all age discrimination burdens commerce” in support of his opinion that 
recognizing claims for “reverse discrimination suits would alleviate the 
congressionally identified burden on commerce.”383 Judge Cole’s comment is 
ironic in light of the costs that commerce will ultimately have to absorb as a 
result of reverse discrimination suits under the ADEA.  The effects of 
recognizing a cause of action for reverse age discrimination are potentially far-
reaching.  The dissent in Cline expressed its concern that it would open the 
floodgates to litigation attacking benefits to older individuals if the reverse 
discrimination claims are permitted.384  The Equal Employment Advisory 
Council (“EEAC”) views Cline as “vastly . . . expand[ing] the number of 
employment actions potentially subject to challenge under the ADEA.”385  By 
failing to read the central prohibition of the ADEA in the context of other 
statutory provisions and relevant legislative history, the Cline court gave the 
ADEA “‘a meaning so broad that it is inconsistent with its accompanying 
 
 380. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 315.  As an Equal Protection Clause case, Murgia focused on the 
absence of evidence of the states discriminating on the basis of age.  Many of the statements 
regarding age in Murgia appear contrary to the congressional findings in the ADEA.  The Murgia 
analogy is only used in this Note to underscore the difference in the interpretation of the ADEA 
and Title VII by the Supreme Court.  The implications of the distinctions between race and age 
discrimination “need not be identical in the constitutional and statutory contexts.”  Note, The Age 
Discrimination and Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REV. 380, 387 (1976). 
 381. Id. at 315–16. 
 382. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (underscoring the 
differences in rationales and remedial schemes of the ADEA and Title VII).  In Kimel, the 
Supreme Court held that rational basis scrutiny was an appropriate measure of evaluating state-
sponsored discrimination against older workers under the Fourteenth Amendment.  Id. 
 383. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 466, 474 (6th Cir. 2002), cert. 
granted, 123 S.Ct. 1786 (2003) (Cole, J., concurring). 
 384. See id. at 476 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
 385. E-mail from Robert E. Williams, Attorney, Equal Employment Advisory Council, to 
Author (Oct. 15, 2002, 09:07:33 CST) (on file with author). 
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words.’”386  In light of the continuous graying of America, if the ADEA is 
viewed as a symmetrical legislation, the claims of “youth” discrimination 
within the protected class will grow exponentially.387 
The cause of action for reverse age discrimination has the potential effect 
of invalidating any retirement policy program that distinguishes between 
employees based on age.  The business community perceives “a serious 
problem for any employer that establishes a minimum eligibility age for retiree 
health insurance benefits[,] or indeed, for any benefit other than a pension.”388  
The challenged practices may include severance pay as well as medical and 
life insurance made available to older employees during such events as 
reductions-in-force or negotiated contracts with unions.  Other practices, such 
as varying the amount of benefits in favor of older employees or using 
premiums paid by younger workers to subsidize the cost of insurance of older 
employees,389 will also be threatened if the Cline decision is allowed to stand. 
The Cline decision is likely to have the most direct negative impact on the 
health benefits offered to retirees.390  Presently, “[m]ore than one-third of 
seniors—almost fourteen million people on Medicare—receive health 
insurance” through employment.391  Employers typically require that the 
covered employees meet the combination of age and service requirements, 
with the most prevalent minimum age being fifty-five.392  Because of the 
prohibitive costs of insurance premiums, which were estimated to rise sixteen 
percent in the year 2002,393 many employers have already scaled back the 
 
 386. AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Util. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 408 (1999) (quoting Gustafson v. Alloyd 
Co., 513 U.S. 561, 575 (1995); see also Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) 
(denouncing interpretations that give “unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress”). 
 387. It is estimated that by 2004, more than half of the American workforce will be in the age 
group protected by the ADEA.  Pontz, supra note 237, at 270 n.19. 
 388. E-mail from Robert E. Williams, Attorney, Equal Employment Advisory Council, to 
Author (Oct. 15, 2002, 09:07:33 CST) (on file with author); see 29 U.S.C. § 623(l)(1)(A) (2000) 
(permitting a minimum age threshold for pension plans). 
 389. Brief of the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Health and Welfare Fund as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at *4–*9, Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 123 S. 
Ct. 1786 (2003) (No. 02-1080), available at 2003 WL 21649487. 
 390. See Brief of the ERISA Industry Committee as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
supra note 246, at *19. 
 391. New Survey Shows Retiree Health Benefits Continue to Decline, at 1, at 
http://www.cmwf.org/media/releases/gabel506%5Frelease04152002.html (last modified April 15, 
2002).   
 392. HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION AND HEWITT ASSOC., The Current State of 
Retiree Health Benefits: Findings from the Kaiser/Hewitt 2002 Retiree Health Survey, at 2 
(2002), available at http://www.kff.org/content /2002/3251/3251.pdf. 
 393. Adam Marcus, Cost of Retiree Benefits Rising, at http://www.hon.ch/News/HSN/ 
510678.html (Dec. 5, 2002). 
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health coverage that they offer.394  The provision of enhanced health benefits to 
older employees is voluntary on the part of the employers and not mandated by 
law.395  If the employers are threatened with the possibility of lawsuits for 
reverse age discrimination because of their inability to provide health benefits 
for the younger employees in the ADEA-protected class, they are likely to 
decline offering any health benefits to retirees.  Instead of encouraging a 
socially-beneficial practice that helps meet the congressional concern for older 
workers, the Cline holding provides a perverse incentive to the employer and 
encourages the employer not to provide any benefits at all.396 
Recognizing a cause of action for reverse age discrimination also poses a 
substantial threat to the collective bargaining process.  In 2001, 13.4% or 
approximately 16.4 million wage and salary workers were union members.397  
These workers had median weekly earnings of $718, as compared to a median 
of $575 for workers who were not represented by unions.398  The economic 
well-being of union workers and their families will be threatened if collective 
bargaining agreements are allowed to be undermined by claims of reverse 
discrimination.  The concern of the dissent in Cline about the impact of the 
Cline decision on the stability of labor relations is well-taken.  Because of the 
shadow cast by the Sixth Circuit on all types of benefits that use age as a 
criterion for determining eligibility, employers, unions, and the collective 
bargaining process itself will suffer because negotiated agreements may 
become subject to a new level of judicial scrutiny. 
 
 394. See Bruce Stuart et al., Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance and Prescription Drug 
Coverage For New Retirees: Dramatic Declines in Five Years, at W3–334 (July 23, 2003) 
(stating that “the number of large employers (500 employees or more) offering coverage to 
Medicare-eligible retirees declined from 57 percent in 1987 to 23 percent in 2001”), available at 
http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/Stuart_Web_Excl_072303.htm.  The decline in the 
number of retirees covered was accompanied by “reduced benefits or increased employees’ share 
of premiums, or both.” Id. 
 395. See Pamela Perun, Phased Retirement Programs for the Twenty-First Century 
Workplace, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 633, 635 (2002) (noting that “[n]othing in ERISA or the 
[tax] [c]ode requires employers to establish benefit plans or mandates the types of benefits those 
plans must offer”). 
 396. Even the AARP expressed fear that in the current economic slump, the employers, 
fearing a lawsuit and attempting to cut costs, will decide not to provide retirement benefits to any 
workers older than 40.  See Andrew Brownstein, ‘Younger’ Workers Can Sue Under the ADEA, 
Sixth Circuit Finds, 38 TRIAL 82, 82 (Oct. 2002) (interviewing Tom Osborne, senior attorney for 
the AARP). 
 397. News Release, Bureau of Labor and Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Union Members 
Summary, Feb. 25, 2003, at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm 
 398. Id.  The Department of Labor noted that “[t]he difference [in wages] reflects a variety of 
influences in addition to coverage by a collective bargaining agreement.”  Id.  Undoubtedly, 
however, the superior wages are correlated with the union representation. 
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The ADEA, like other employment discrimination statutes, does not 
exempt the terms of collective bargaining agreements from its reach.399  
However, the courts have recognized the importance of collective bargaining 
and have demonstrated judicial respect towards such agreements in a variety of 
cases dealing with employment discrimination.  For example, in the context of 
Title VII, the Supreme Court ruled in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison 
that an employer was not required to make an exception to seniority rules that 
determined shift assignments in order to accommodate an employee’s religious 
observance.400  The Court emphasized the importance of collective bargaining 
and the seniority rights obtained through such bargaining: “Collective 
bargaining, aimed at effecting workable and enforceable agreements between 
management and labor, lies at the core of our national labor policy.”401 
In the end, it will be society at large that will ultimately pay for reverse 
discrimination lawsuits.  While offering the entire range of benefits to all 
workers older than forty will likely be cost-prohibitive to employers, the only 
alternative left for them would be to deny the benefits altogether.  Unlike in the 
context of race and sex, this action will affect every member of the society if 
not immediately, then later in life either directly or through aging parents and 
other family members.  As the dissent in Cline deftly noted, the needs of older 
people increase with age,402 and it stands to reason that older individuals 
require greater protection.  “Pension, and medical and life insurance plans must 
take account of age, if only because life expectancy and health decrease as age 
 
 399. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 630(a), (d) (2000) (specifically listing “labor organizations” as one 
type of covered entity subject to its provisions). 
 400. 432 U.S. 63, 79 (1977). 
 401. Id.  In the context of the ADA, the Supreme Court has recently addressed the interaction 
between a “reasonable accommodation” and a bona fide seniority system in US Airways, Inc. v. 
Barnett.  535 U.S. 391 (2002).  While the seniority system at issue in Barnett was not a 
collectively-bargained system, but rather a system unilaterally imposed by management, the 
Court relied on cases that involved seniority systems negotiated under the collective bargaining 
agreement.  See id. at 403–404 (citing Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 at 79-
80; Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1175 (10th Cir. 1999); Eckles v. Consol. Rail 
Corp., 94 F.3d 1041, 1047–48 (7th Cir. 1996); Shea v. Tisch, 870 F.2d 786, 790 (1st Cir. 1989); 
Carter v. Tisch, 822 F.2d 465, 469 (4th Cir. 1987)).  The Supreme Court in Barnett held that the 
“reasonable accommodation” standard does not ordinarily compel the employer to violate 
provisions of a seniority system in order to permit the job transfer of a disabled employee.  See id. 
at 393-94.  Nevertheless, the Court made clear that an employee may “present evidence of special 
circumstances” that warrants a finding that an accommodation is reasonable despite its impact on 
a seniority system. Id. at 394.  Similarly, case law has recognized that collectively-bargained 
seniority trumps the need for accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.  29 U.S.C. §§ 
791, 793–94 (2000).  The Seventh Circuit, for example, was willing to uphold a collective 
bargaining agreement when the rights of the protected class were negatively affected.  Eckles, 94 
F.3d at 1051–52. 
 402. Cline v. Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc., 269 F.3d. 466, 476 (Williams, J., dissenting). 
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increases.”403  Finally, as noted by the concurrence in Cline, there is something 
inherently counterintuitive about prohibiting a preferential policy toward older 
members of the protected group.404  The entire concept of setting the “younger 
old” against the “older old” appears bizarre and objectionable.405 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
The argument that reverse age discrimination is actionable under the 
ADEA, while plausible, is not convincing.  The strongest clues to 
congressional understanding of the nature of the protection offered by the 
ADEA are found not only in the text of the ADEA’s central prohibition but 
also in the context of the entire statute and its legislative history.  The multiple 
references in the ADEA to “older” adults, as well as the statute’s stated 
purpose of eradicating only arbitrary discrimination in employment, 
underscore the fact that the blanket prohibition of employment discrimination 
on the basis of age was not the intent of Congress. 
The ADEA exceptions, especially those concerning seniority and ERIPs, 
exemplify Congress’s recognition that age, unlike race or sex, must be taken 
into account in certain circumstances.  Legislative history, while not explicit on 
the subject, also supports the view that protection of the younger workers was 
not the goal of the ADEA’s framers.  Legislative and judicial recognition of 
age as being profoundly different from other categories that require protection 
lends credence to the conclusion that the interpretation of the ADEA should be 
treated differently from Title VII. 
While the ADEA provides minimum standards for combating age 
discrimination in employment, younger workers are not left without recourse 
because states are free to enact statutes that will offer symmetrical protection.  
The economic and social ramifications of allowing reverse age discrimination 
claims cannot be overstated.  Fearing a potential ADEA lawsuit, employers 
will be hesitant to offer increased benefits to older workers.  Such a result 
would frustrate, not serve, Congress’s end.  Therefore, the Supreme Court will 





 403. Rutherglen, supra note 259, at 498. 
 404. See supra Part III.B.2 for a discussion of Judge Cole’s concurrence in Cline. 
 405. The senior attorney for the AARP, while acknowledging that the AARP has never in the 
past taken the side of the employer, called the idea “distasteful.”  See Brownstein, supra note 396, 
at 82. 
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